Brazil’s South-South Cooperation and Development:
The Case of a Rural Development Programme in Mozambique

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List of Abbreviations

ABC  Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (Brazilian Agency of Cooperation)

BRICS  Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa group

BNDES  Brazilian Development Bank

DAC  Development Assistance Committee

Embrapa  Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agrícola (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation)

IBSA  India, Brazil and South Africa group

IR  International Relations

JA!  Justiça Ambiental! (Environmental Justice!)

JICA  Japanese International Cooperation Agency

OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OMR  Observatório do Meio Rural (Rural Space Observatory)

ORAM  Organização Rural de Apoio Mútuo (Rural Association for Mutual Support)

PAA Africa  Purchase from Africans for Africa

ProSAVANA  Triangular Cooperation Programme for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique

UN  United Nations

UNAC  União Nacional dos Camponeses (Peasants National Union)

UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

US  United States of America

WTO  World Trade Organization
1. Introduction

In recent years, international development cooperation has presented thrilling changes. Under the new label of *South-South cooperation*, emerging states of the Global South have been increasingly promoting development programmes in cooperation with other developing countries. In addition to China, India and South Africa, Brazil has become a central player in this field.

Since the 2000s, Brazil has striven to consolidate its position as a global power and as a speaker for the Global South. As such, the country has intensified its relations with other developing countries and massively expanded its foreign policy and international development cooperation, especially on the African continent. Challenging the traditional international development assistance approach and vocabulary, Brazil has claimed an international development cooperation approach guided by the principles of solidarity and horizontality among Southern states and by a notion of development based on mutual interest and common goals. Thereby, Brazil has argued for new development models based on experiences and aspirations of nations of the Global South.

The emerging phenomenon of South-South cooperation is currently an important discussion topic in the discipline of International Relations (IR). As it has been observed by different IR scholars (e.g. Viera 2013), Brazil has evoked a new discourse of international development, which might trigger important transformations in development aid and challenge North-South relations in general. Nonetheless, the phenomenon has not been studied sufficiently. A few IR studies recount Brazil’s novel rhetoric, while others suggest scepticism towards its alleged difference from traditional aid approaches, despite believing in its overall transformative character. However, most IR studies on the topic lack detailed analysis not only of the discursive character of Brazil’s South-South cooperation but also of its practice and application in the field. More importantly, although standing at the core of Brazil’s South-South cooperation, the concept of development evoked by Brazil has not been at the focus of any of these studies.

Thus, the present work poses the following research question: to what extent does Brazil present a new model of development within its South-South cooperation approach?
Throughout the present analysis I intend to examine how Brazil proposes a new concept of development within its international development cooperation, and to what extent such new conceptualization succeeds in breaking from mainstream, dominant notions of development. In order to operationalize such interrogations, my analysis starts from the following questions: how is Brazil’s South-South cooperation discursively presented? How is Brazil’s South-South cooperation practically implemented? In order to answer these questions, I undertook an exploratory research based on an in-depth single case analysis. In doing so, I analysed the discourses and practices of the ProSAVANA programme, Brazil’s South-South cooperation most emblematic and also most controversial programme (Chichava et al. 2013). I undertook an analysis of extensive text material related to the programme, as well as of interviews which I conducted with policy makers, development workers, experts, civil society actors and other stakeholders of the programme, both in Brazil and Mozambique.

Initiated by Brazil and Japan in the late 2000s, ProSAVANA addresses the issues of rural poverty and food security in Mozambique, envisioning the improvement of the livelihood of inhabitants of the Nacala Corridor region. ProSAVANA is presented as a programme that, based on solidarity among the cooperating parts, aims to create new development models. However, in its practice, ProSAVANA appears to repeat old patterns of international development aid, both in terms of international cooperation and development approaches.

Thus, in order to comprehend the ProSAVANA programme and Brazil’s international development cooperation, the departing point of my analysis is the core notion of Brazil’s novel South-South cooperation approach: development. Therefore, I focus on Brazil’s construction and operationalization of the concept of development, analysing both its discourse and its practice. By doing so, I intend to contribute to the IR debate on the topic, offering a bridge between, on the one hand, IR studies on South-South cooperation and, on the other, development theories and social scientific studies on development and international development cooperation. In addition, focusing on practical and local application of an international development programme, I intend to add insight from a more local level to the research on the topic. Thereby, I situate my analytical framework in the fields of sociology of development and sociology of international relations, or, more specifically, sociology of international development cooperation.
The present work is structured as follows: In the next chapter, I present IR’s current state of research on the emergence of the phenomenon of South-South cooperation, focusing on the Brazilian case. Afterwards, in chapter 2, I present an outline on main development theories, analysing the emergence of the concept of development in international politics. Thereby, I emphasize modernization theory and dependency theory, and present as well social scientific studies of development as a concept and as a discourse. I finish the chapter with a focus on studies of development within international development cooperation. In chapter 3, I explain the selection of my case study and present my methodology of research. Then, in chapter 4, I move to the analysis, first presenting a discourse analysis of Brazil’s South-South cooperation. In chapter 5, I focus my analysis on the case of the ProSAVANA programme. Here, I first present an analysis of the discourses sustaining the conception of programme, ranging from the discursive construction of the problem to the discursive presentation of the solutions encompassed by the programme. Then, I present an analysis of ProSAVANA’s practical implementation. In the conclusion, I discuss ProSAVANA and Brazil’s South-South cooperation, bridging analysis and theory. I argue that Brazil’s South-South cooperation might have an empowering new rhetoric, but, as it application shows, it falls in the same old story of traditional foreign development aid approaches. As both the discourse analysis and the analysis of praxis show, the central notion of Brazil’s South-South cooperation, development, is still marked by a modernization paradigm. Such idea of development based on modernization theory is intrinsically related to Global North standards, and thus falls short of recognizing and addressing issues of economically disadvantaged groups of the Global South.
2. The emergence of South-South cooperation

“Development” has for decades been one of the most used term in politics around the globe. Although the omnipresence of “development” in the language of politics might obscure the term’s origins, as if it had always been there, “development” is a relatively new term. As different scholars have pointed out (cf. Lepenies 2008, Escobar 1995, Sachs 2010a, Esteva 2010), the historical origins of its emergence in the international sphere can be traced back to the 1950s, when the term gained international political notoriety and became a central guiding principle in international politics. Although the term was surely not used for the first time then, “development” as it is understood in politics around the globe today was greatly influenced by post-World War II US foreign policy. In 1949, US President Harry S. Truman stated in his famous inaugural address that

[we] must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. [...] Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people. [...] I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development. Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, [...] and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens. [...] It must be a worldwide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom.

With the cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture, and labor in this country, this programme can greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations and can raise substantially their standards of living. The old imperialism-exploitation for foreign profit has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a programme of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing. All countries, including our own, will greatly benefit from a constructive programme for the better use of the world’s human and natural resources. (Truman 1949).

As Lepenies (2008) explains, Truman’s speech marks the first time the task of development was publicly addressed as a global responsibility. Through international “cooperation,” the so-called developed countries should take the task of helping the rest of the world to overcome its condition of underdevelopment. After some fluctuations in US commitment to

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1 Emphases mine.
foreign aid in the 1950s, the escalation of the Cold War in the 1960s, among other factors, fostered the maturation and the institutionalisation of the idea of international development cooperation (Edwards 2014). In 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was founded, by European states, Canada and the US and joined a few years later by Japan. Ever since, the OECD assembles those states considered as donors in what they usually term “foreign development assistance” and thereby plays a major political role. As Renzio and Seifert (2014: 1861) explain, the members of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) “defined what could count as development assistance and what could not, kept accurate records of members’ foreign aid flows, and developed principles, standards, and procedures that members were invited to follow.”

The conception of development assistance has not been immune to changes. More recently, the mainstream views on development and foreign development assistance have been challenged by the action of emerging states that are not member of the DAC (Six 2009). In the last 15 years, there has been a considerable increase in the political and economic relations between the once-called underdeveloped/developing states, also known today as states of the Global South. In the current context of international depolarization, “new emerging powers” such as China, India and Brazil have intensified their political performance in the global sphere, especially in their relation with other states of the Global South (Hurrell 2012, Ayllón Pino 2012, Rampa et al. 2012). Thereby, these countries have proposed a new approach on foreign development assistance, which has been framed as South-South cooperation.

2.1 South-South relations and cooperation

While the idea of development assistance was formed in the post-World War II context, the notion of solidarity has become increasingly popular among countries of the Global South. As

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2 “Foreign development assistance” has also been termed as “official development assistance” or “foreign development aid”. Although some countries of the Global North recently have also opted for the term “international development cooperation”, the focus on the term “cooperation” has been more typical of South-South cooperation approaches. Therefore, in this thesis, I use the term “development assistance” to demark the approach and perspective of DAC members, whereas I use “international development cooperation” to highlight the terminology that is favoured by South-South cooperation providers. Similarly, I alternate between “developed countries” and “Global North” and between “developing countries” and “Global South”.

3 As International Relations scholars explain, the emergence of states of the Global South happens in this world power constellation where a traditionally hegemonic power - the United States - has been losing prominence (e.g. Hurrell 2012).
Renzio and Seifert (2014) and Rampa et al. (2012) explain, a first milestone for the emergence of this notion was the Bandung Conference in 1955, which gathered leaders of 25 Asian and African countries. One of the outcomes of this meeting was a declaration that stressed the importance of internal cooperation and coordination of mutual interests. Later on, the notion of South-South solidarity was fortified by the Non-Allied Movement formed in 1961 and also by the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, which promptly founded the Group of developing countries (G77). Finally, the 1978 Buenos Aires Plan, which was endorsed by the UN’s Special Unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, represented the first step towards formal recognition of development assistance among countries of the Global South. Nonetheless, the 1980s and 1990s global economic crisis was a major constraint of South-South cooperation initiatives (Renzio & Seifert 2014, Rampa et al. 2012).

From the 2000s on, the increase of economic and global importance of countries of the Global South happened in concomitance with a strengthening of the South-South relations worldwide. Perhaps the clearest expression of the emerging political and economic importance of Southern states is the creation of the BRICS bloc at the end of the 2000s, formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Kabunda 2011 apud Zorzal e Silva 2014). In 2014, as result of the 6th BRICS yearly summit, the leaders of these five states signed an agreement on mutual cooperation and launched the New Development Bank, also known as the BRICS Development Bank. With a primary focus of lending on infrastructure projects, the BRICS Bank started with a capital of US$50 billion and has an authorized lending of up to US$34 billion annually (Khanna 2014). As Harman and Williams (2014) observe, the BRICS Bank represents an interesting alternative for developing countries and a counterpoint to the dominance of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the global arena.

Accompanying a substantial rise in economic relations among Global South countries⁴, the increase of international development cooperation among these states has been more than

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⁴ There has been a very significant increase in trade not only among the BRICS countries themselves but also among countries of the Global South in general, most notably with the participation of African states. For example, as Harman and Williams (2014) highlight, by the beginning of this decade, China became the second largest trading partner with the African continent (after the United States), totaling in 2011 US$120 billion in imports from Africa and US$80 billion in exports to Africa. The share of China, Brazil, Russia and India in Africa’s total trade will rise from 20% to an estimated 33%, to over US$500 billion (Rampa et al. 2012). Brazil’s exports to Africa have grown five times between 2003 and 2008: from US$6,000 to US$30,000 (Seibert 2009). More
evident. In 2003, prior to the creation of the BRICS, the IBSA group was founded by India, Brazil and South Africa with the goal of intensifying what has been termed South-South cooperation (Seibert 2009). Ever since, beyond the IBSA, China and other states of the Global South have intensified their participation in international development programmes under the label of South-South cooperation\(^5\).

In general, in the 2000s, different authors observed an exponential increase of official development assistance flows coming from sources other than DAC-members (e.g. Harman & Williams 2014, Renzio & Seifert 2014). In 2009, the estimated total gross international development cooperation flows from such countries amounted to almost US$11 billion (Zimmermann & Smith 2011). This represents roughly 8% of global gross official development assistance, which stood at US$133.2 billion for DAC countries in 2009 (see Figure 1). Although still smaller if compared to the amount provided by countries of the Global North, the participation of South-South cooperation flows is expected to reach up to 15-20% by the present decade (Renzio & Seifert 2014).

\(^5\) Renzio and Seifert (2014) identify two groups of countries which can be considered components of the set of providers of South-South Cooperation. The first includes a small group of large players, both in size and influence, which have been active in [South-South Cooperation] for a longer period and share a stronger rejection of DAC-related principles and practices [...]: China, India, Brazil. The second group is larger and more varied; it includes a set of smaller middle-income countries whose aid programmes are more recent and have increased substantially in recent years, although they remain more limited in size and scope when compared with those of the first group [...]. This group would include at least Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, Venezuela etc. They can be said to represent the ‘second wave’ of [South-South cooperation] actors” (idem: 1865).
As we can see in the graph above (Figure 1), in 2009 Brazil appeared as 32nd top international development cooperation financier, having supplied US$362 billion in development cooperation programmes in 2009, mostly in Latin America and Africa (Zimmermann & Smith 2011).

In this context, the notion of “South-South cooperation” has globally emerged. Challenging the terminology used by most countries of the Global North, Brazil and other states of the Global South have avoided talking of “development aid” or “development assistance”, or using the dichotomic terms “donor” and “recipient” countries. Rather, these states have stressed the terms “development cooperation” or “South-South cooperation” when engaging in such agreements (Quadir 2013).

Due to these changes, there have been growing efforts within IR academia and international institutions to analyse and define the so-called South-South cooperation approach. A widely quoted UNCTAD report defines South-South cooperation as “the process, institutions and arrangements designed to promote political, economic and technical co-operation among developing countries in pursuit of common development goals” (UNCTAD 2010 apud e.g.)
Rampa et al. 2012\(^6\)). Although very broad, this definition points out to a central distinction between South-South cooperation and North-South assistance: instead of the notion of one developed donor country offering aid or assistance to a developing recipient country, South-South cooperation implies that all parts involved are pursuing development and mutually benefiting from the cooperation initiative (Zimmermann & Smith 2011).

Thereby, the notion of South-South cooperation entails the rejection or at least distancing from the traditional development assistance approach (Zimmermann & Smith 2011, Renzio & Seifert 2014, Viera 2013). Backed by agreements ranging from the 1955 Bandung Conference, the 1978 Buenos Aires Plan and other more recent conventions on cooperation, providers of South-South cooperation usually operationalize the following principles when defining their approach: solidarity, horizontality, mutual benefit and non-interference in domestic affairs. These principles are allegedly absent in the development assistance approaches taken by providers from the Global North (Renzio & Seifert 2014).

Thus, in an effort to comprehend the South-South cooperation approach, various IR scholars have striven to elucidate the differences between this new approach and the traditional North-South development assistance approach. In general, it has been observed that governmental actors of states providing South-South cooperation argue that the development assistance offered by Northern countries is not driven by solidarity, but by self-interest (Ayllón Pino 2012, Renzio & Seifert 2014, Quadir 2014). In this sense, these Southern actors usually stress that their cooperation projects are driven by demand from the receiving partner, and not determined a priori or conceived through a top-down approach like the conventional development assistance schemes (Rampa et al. 2014, Quadir 2014). South-South cooperation providers also suggest that there is no horizontality in the North-South relations in general. Allegedly, their similar development experience and their shared geopolitical position imply a horizontal relation among states of the Global South, which is not given in a North-South relation scheme (Rampa et al. 2014). Whereas DAC donors’ development assistance is dressed to appear to be “conceived as ‘charity’” (Rampa et al. 2014: 258), Southern providers of development cooperation stress that all parts involved in a cooperation agreement, including themselves, will benefit from the international

\(^6\) Emphasis mine.
development cooperation programmes, as they all seek mutual development goals (Rampa et al. 2014, Zimmermann & Smith 2011).

Furthermore, since the 1990s, DAC countries’ development assistance approach has focused on good governance, requiring that their assisted parts undertake “Western-backed policies of structural reforms” (Viera 2013: 292). For Viera (idem: 293), “unlike traditional Western donors,” providers of South-South cooperation “often engage as development partners, facilitators and enablers rather than ‘teachers’ of best behaviour.” They argue for a non-tied development cooperation approach, which respects the other country’s sovereignty and domestic affairs, thus different from traditional donors’ emphasis on human rights and governance (Rampa et al. 2014).

Yet, the link between how South-South cooperation has been defined on the one hand and how it has been taking place in praxis one the other, is still a controversial topic among IR scholars. Some scholars stress that the guiding principles defended by Southern development cooperation providers are not necessarily observable in the practice of their cooperation schemes, suggesting that they are rather a rhetorical strategy in their attempt to define and promote themselves vis-à-vis traditional development assistance donors form the North. In this sense, these scholars question the actual novelty of the South-South cooperation framework, relativizing its alleged difference from the DAC development assistance approach (e.g. Renzio & Seifert 2014, Quadir 2014, Cabral et al. 2013).

Nonetheless, these and other IR scholars usually agree that even as a narrative (Quadir 2014, Cabral et al. 2013) or rhetoric (Renzio & Seifert 2014), South-South cooperation might still be a powerful phenomenon. In general, they argue that South-South cooperation has created an opportunity for developing countries to enjoy different financing options to choose from (Quadir 2014, Renzio & Seifert 2014, Six 2009, Rampa et al. 2014, Harman & Williams 2014, Woods 2008). Some are more optimistic and believe that the emerging South-South cooperation even has the potential to challenge the status quo of development assistance, in a way that is beneficial for Southern states (Woods 2008, Six 2009, Harman & Williams 2014). For example, Harman and Williams (2014: 937) maintain that the rise of non-traditional donors signal “dispersal of authority in terms of who gets to set the development agenda and who has influence over developing states.” Quadir (2014: 333) understands that the discourse of South-South cooperation has managed to be a powerful one. Although the author
contends that Southern donors are “driven primarily by their national political and economic interests” and, as also argued by Zimmermann and Smith (2014), that the “rhetoric of non-tied aid does not have much of an empirical grounding,” he maintains that South-South cooperation “questions the conventional top-down, conditionality-driven aid approaches” and challenges North-South international relations schemes (idem: 333-334). Due to this latent challenging aspect, Woods (2008: 1205) called the emergence of South-South cooperation “a silent revolution.”

Notwithstanding, other IR scholars argue that compared to the traditional DAC development assistance, South-South cooperation actually represents alternative practical advantages for developing countries. Ayllón Pino (2012) mentions that one cannot deny the existence of the solidarity principle, even though South-South development operations might benefit the provider part. For him, South-South cooperation “offers an advantageous cost-efficiency ratio” for the recipient part. In addition, writing from a (South) African perspective, Rampa et al. (2014) contend that the rise of new donors from the Global South might represent a somewhat new, positive alternative for African countries. Based on empiric observation, the authors stress that the absence of self-interest in South-South development cooperation agreements is not at issue, as cooperation providers clearly obtain political and economic paybacks from their development projects with African partners, as openly implied by the emphasis on mutual development. However, differently from traditional donors, cooperation providers such as China, India and Brazil have focused on major infrastructural projects, which might be a direct response to development aspirations of African governments (idem). Agreeing with Viera (2013), Rampa et al. (2014) also point out to the distinctive character of South-South cooperation concerning its approach of not tiding the cooperation to domestic affairs such as governance human rights, under the principle of respecting the partner country’s sovereignty. Besides, for Rampa et al. (2014), even though the guiding principles of South-South cooperation might be to some extent rhetorical, more sources of development assistance flows might not only result in an increase of choice for African states but also have

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8 For instance, Rampa et al. (2012) highlight that the political support of African states is very important in international fora, and, especially in the case of China and India, international development cooperation programmes have benefited companies from those countries.
the effect of augmenting the power of bargain of African governments when dealing with DAC donors.

Six (2009) goes further and maintains that the rise of Southern states as donors not only “questions the established modes of development cooperation” but also “the development paradigm as a whole” (idem: 1103). He agrees with Phillips (2008: 26) when she argues that “the dominance of western countries in framing the terms and content of [development] debates will necessarily be eroded.” For Six (2009), the phenomenon of South-South development cooperation might result in a decline of the Western development paradigm. The author (idem: 1118) sees the rise of new donors as an important “global political transformation.”

In the light of this discussion, the next section will take a closer look at the South-South cooperation approach presented by Brazil, especially in its relation with African states.

2.2 Brazil’s South-South cooperation

Similar to other countries of the Global South, Brazil has traditionally been a recipient of development assistance, but more recently, has gained more international prominence as a provider of cooperation flows as well. According to a study of the Brazilian Agency of Cooperation (ABC), between 2005 and 2009, the sum of Brazil’s expenditures in international development cooperation rose from US$ 158 million to over US$ 362 million⁹ (IPEA & ABC 2010). In addition to the global context of multipolarization, Brazil’s political change in 2003 was a major contributor for the rise of its new cooperation approach, which is said to be based on a notion of international development for and by the Global South.

The beginning of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s term in office in 2003 is considered a turning point in Brazil’s foreign policy (Heleno & Martins 2014, Dauvergne & Farias 2014, Ayllón Pino 2012, Seibert 2009). Being the first leftist head of state since the 1960s, Lula evoked a rhetoric which emphasized social justice and fairness in international relations. These two principles are said to have guided Brazil’s foreign policy throughout Lula’s administration (2003-2010), which was marked by a loss of focus on Europe and USA and by

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⁹ Among different modalities of development cooperation, humanitarian aid had the most significant increase (from US$ 0,5 million to US$ 79 million), followed by technical cooperation, which grew from US$ 11 million in 2005 to US$ 48,5 million in 2009 (IPEA & ABC 2010). The ProSAVANA programme, for instance, is understood in ABC terms as technical cooperation.
the strengthening of the relations with other countries of the Global South (Ayllón Pino 2012). As Hal Brands (apud Dauvergne & Faria 2012: 906) states, the country’s new foreign policy aimed “to hasten the transition from the dominance of the developed world to a multipolar order in which international power balances and institutions are more favourable to the assertion of Brazil’s interests.”

As a result, what Viera (2013) calls “the Brazilian model of development cooperation” was promoted for the first time by President Lula as one of the main pillars of Brazil’s foreign policy. Between 2003 and July 2010, 475 technical cooperation projects were implemented or under implementation by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency in at least 99 countries. The realm of agriculture was the main one, totalling 21,8% of the projects, followed by health (16%) and education (12%). In terms of geography, the financial distribution of these projects concentrated in Africa (48% and 36 cooperating countries), Latin America and the Caribbean (41% and 30 countries) and Middle East and Asia (11%). From all countries in cooperation with Brazil, Mozambique received the highest proportion of financial flows (15,7%), followed by Timor-Leste (15,1%), Guinea Bissau (14,4%), Haiti (13,1%) and Cabo Verde (9,7%) (IPEA & ABC 2010, Ayllón Pino 2012).

Hence, Africa has been the focus of Brazilian development cooperation. Before the Lula era, Brazil’s foreign policy gave only marginal attention to the continent, focusing rather on neighbouring states, Europe and US. In the 1990s, for example, five Brazilian embassies in Africa were closed due to austerity policy (Seibert 2009). Yet, between 2003 and 2010, the number of Brazilian embassies across Africa more than doubled - from 18 to 38\(^{10}\), which made Brazil the fourth most diplomatic represented state in the continent, behind the US (49), China (48) and France (46 embassies). Lula and his foreign minister went on several diplomatic missions to Africa, reaching record levels in the history of Brazilian foreign policy. Lula himself paid 27 visits to a total of 20 African countries, Mozambique and South Africa being the most visited (Schreiber 2015, Fellet 2013, Seibert 2009). In addition, in support of cooperation initiatives, different Brazilian institutions expanded to the African continent. For instance, the Brazilian Corporation of Agricultural Research (Embrapa) opened two regional offices in

\(^{10}\) In turn, the number of African embassies in Brazil went from 16 to 27 between 2003 and 2007 (Seibert 2009).
Africa, one of them in Mozambique, backing the implementation of the ProSAVANA programme.

In terms of content, different IR scholars (e.g. Viera 2013, Ayllón Pino 2013) and governmental actors (IPEA & Banco Mundial 2011) define the Brazilian international development cooperation approach in line with the “South-South cooperation paradigm” (Viera 2013). Thereby, the following principles are highlighted in its guidelines: solidarity, horizontality, non-interference in domestic affairs, co-responsibility and inter-state partnership, exchange of shared experiences, demand-driven, mutual interest, non-conditionality, non-attachment to commercial interests, and common development goals. The latter is presented by Brazil as a key distinction from traditional development assistance approaches: unlike DAC donors, Brazil is also a so-called developing country, thus, just as the other cooperation partner country.

In this regard, as observed by different scholars, Brazil’s South-South cooperation approach has focused on projects that might foster the partner country’s development. Ayllón Pino (2012) and Rampa et al. (2014) note that the Brazilian Cooperation Agency has focused on so-called structural projects, which are believed to have a larger impact on development in general. As Quadir (2014: 324) highlights, development is also at the core of Brazilian Agency of Cooperation’s programmes that are labelled under “technical cooperation,” which, allied to the emphasis on infrastructure, comprises a focus on transfer of skills and capacity building. For Quadir, “[t]he primary goal of [Brazil’s] technical cooperation initiative is to contribute to the development of the partner countries” (ibid.).

Overall, different scholars suggest that the notion of development has become the ultimate guiding principle of Brazil’s foreign policy and its South-South cooperation approach (Seibert 2009, Ayllón Pino 2012, Dauvergne & Farias 2014, Quadir 2014). As Dauvergne and Farias (2012) observe, development has been a core concept in Brazil’s domestic policies. From the 1940s on, Brazil’s governmental approach can be understood as the national-developmentalist paradigm. After a wave of neoliberalism in the 1990s, this paradigm

12 Dauvergne and Farias (2012: 904) remember that the Brazilian national constitution lists “development” as one of the “fundamental goals of the Federative Republic of Brazil” and repeats the term over 50 times throughout.
recovered its strength with the Workers Party in the presidency from 2003 on. Since then, the state has played a more active role in shaping the country’s economy, now with a multilateral foreign trade approach (idem).

As Dauvergne and Farias (2012) explain, “development” has become a central concept in Brazil’s identity. The image of Brazil as the emerging developing country due to its recent economic growth in addition to the awareness of recent domestic achievements concerning the reduction of poverty and social inequality has strengthened the centrality of the notion of development in Brazil’s foreign policy. Since 2003, Brazilian actors have increasingly deployed the concept of development in the international arena, especially in the conception of South-South cooperation (Dauvergne & Farias 2012, Ayllón Pino 2012). In this regard, Brazil’s “diplomacy of development” has often operationalized the idea that Brazil, more than DAC members or any other developed country, has the know-how on current development strategies for other countries facing similar “development challenges” (Veira 2013: 293).

More importantly, in its foreign policy, Brazil has argued for the search of new development models that respond to the needs and experiences of the Global South (Viera 2013, Seibert 2009). This is also reflected through its focus on internationalization of economic trade, searching for more trade and regional development strategies particularly with other countries of the Global South. Pointing out to the principle of mutual benefit, Brazilian actors stress that Brazil’s South-South cooperation is an instrument of regional, international and mutual development (Seibert 2009, Dauvergne & Farias 2012, Quadir 2014). In his well-known commencement speech, Lula made his views clear when he stated that “in [his] government, Brazil’s diplomatic action will be oriented by a humanistic perspective, and will be, above all, an instrument of national development” (apud Dauvergne & Farias 2012:907). Similarly, his party colleague and successor President Dilma Rousseff affirmed that

> [t]he foreign policy of a country is more than its projection onto the international stage [...]. It is also an essential component of a national development project, especially in a world that is increasingly interdependent. The internal and external dimensions of a country’s foreign policy are then inseparable. (apud Dauvergne & Farias 2012: 913).

The principle of mutual benefit is clearly observable in Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa, the continent that has been the main receiver of new programmes under Brazil’s South-South cooperation. In this regard, Garcia and Kato (2014) highlight that the Brazilian development
cooperation happens in addition to and in support of direct investments both from Brazilian government and private sector, thus benefitting Brazil’s national development. Heleno and Martins (2014) note that, in complementation to its development cooperation, the Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa has supported the action of Brazilian companies on the continent, especially in Mozambique, such as mining company Vale, semi-public national energy corporation Petrobras, and major construction companies Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez, Camargo Correa, etc. According to the authors, this support happens not only financially by the Brazilian Development Bank, which in 2003 initiated a new credit line especially for the internationalization of Brazilian companies, but also directly through the action of Brazilian diplomacy.

Notwithstanding Brazil’s foreign policy’s emphasis on national development, most IR studies on the subject contend that the Brazilian South-South cooperation model benefits the counterparts involved in the cooperation as well. As Dauvergne and Farias (2012: 913) put it, “one of the greatest strengths of Brazil’s strategy is that its efforts do benefit other developing countries (even if asymmetrically) at very little cost to them.” Overall, for most IR scholars, Brazil’s South-South cooperation, with is focus on mutual development and differentiated perspective on development from the South for the South can be a powerful transformative phenomenon for developing countries (e.g. Viera 2014, Six 2009, Woods 2008).

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13 As Garcia (2011) explains, the directives of the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) were changed in 2003 so that the Bank could offer loans also to projects abroad which were led by Brazilian companies, as long as, according to the new guidelines, these projects would also contribute to “social and economic development” in Brazil (BNDES apud Garcia 2011: 2).
3. The emergence of development

3.1 Modernization and development

Besides attributing international notoriety to the concept of development, President Truman’s speech marks the first time the term “underdeveloped” as opposition to “developed” was politically used for a wider public. As Rist (1997) explains, this terminological innovation shaped how “development” is still understood today - not only as process but also as in relation to “underdevelopment.” The latter is related to the idea that “development” implies a path to a higher stage, a path which all nations in the world - regardless of historical or cultural particularities, whether former colonies or colonizers\(^\text{14}\) - are destined to follow.

In the theoretical field, different authors have supported such normative and political ideas of development as presented by Truman. In the post-World War II context, a strong stream within US academia constructed a theoretical and analytical apparatus both to understand social change and to advise on development strategies across the globe. This stream of thought is known as modernization theory. Often used as a synonym for “development theory” in singular, modernization theory indeed set the ground of development thinking as we know today (Leys 1996).

One of the most iconic and influential development scholars of this time was US economist and political theorist Walt Rostow. Departing from Marxist ideas of economic growth but clearly rejecting communist stances, Rostow’s *Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960) proposes a model based on a classification of different stages of development. In short, Rostow (1960) describes how traditional societies (1\(^{\text{st}}\) stage), once the preconditions of take-off (2\(^{\text{nd}}\) exist, can then take-off (3\(^{\text{rd}}\), evolve to the level of maturity (4\(^{\text{th}}\)), and then reach the 5\(^{\text{th}}\) and last stage, namely high mass consumption. Marking the universality of his theory, Rostow (idem: 164) sustains that all societies of the world could be identify, “in their economic dimension, as lying within to one of these five categories.”

The first of Rostow’s five stages of development, traditional societies, corresponds to the ultimate level underdevelopment, marking a kind of zero degree in history, in which modern technology is absent. On the other end of Rostow’s scale, the two highest stages of

\(^{14}\) As Rist (1997) notes, the power imbalance between coloniser and colonised nations is neutralized by Truman’s conception of the world.
development (*maturity and high mass consumption*) correspond to the level of development of those countries which have had experienced the Industrial Revolution, those countries also called the Western, modern world, geographically located in Europe and North America. Thus, modernity appears as the natural, final goal of development also for the remaining still non-modern, underdeveloped societies of the world.

As Rist (1997) points out, the success of Rostow’s book was due to the consonance of his ideas with dominant social and economic scientific views of the half of the last century, such as development scholar and Nobel Prize winner Lewis (1954). Besides the academic field, Rostow worked as a political advisor for the US government, exercising decisive influence over how both development and, by extension, development assistance are conceived. As Lepenies (2008) explains, in Rostow’s (1960), as in most mainstream development models ever since, there is the idea that every society has in itself the capacity to achieve development. For instance, development theorist Lewis (1955 *apud* Kößler 1998) asserted even that development can be achieved once there is “the will to make an effort.”\(^\text{15}\) Based on the understanding that the modernization, in the context of the industrial revolution in Northern Europe was based on efforts that were a result of the efforts of these nations, modernization theory assumes that development is dependent on the dynamic of endogenous factors only (Galindo 2004:117). Accordingly, the idea of development assistance presupposes that “the external intent to develop [...] will lead to internal processes of ‘immanent development’ in the underdeveloped countries” (Lepenies 2008: 203).

Moreover, as clearly illustrated in Rostow’s models, modernization theory assumes that development is accompanied by a shift from tradition to modernity (Rist 1997). Under this logic, international development assistance programmes have applied modernization strategies within traditional societies as a way to achieve higher stages of development. For instance, increase of modern technology and promotion of modern values and practices have often been addressed by development assistance initiatives around the globe (idem).

### 3.2 Development and dependency

From the 1950s and 1960s on, a stream of critical scholars gained notoriety in the debate on development. Emerging in Latin American academia, this school of thought would later be

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\(^\text{15}\) Translation mine. Original: „Willen, sich anzustrengen“.
known as Dependency Theory, represented among others by the works of Prebisch (1950), Cardoso and Faletto (1959), Frank (1966) and Marini (2009). In general, these scholars refute modernization theory for its view of development as a lineal uniform natural process. Besides, they disagree with the mainstream assumption that development is dependent to factors internal to each society only. Dependency theorists contend that there are a series of particularities that have to be observed when analysing both national and local development processes. They stress that there are rather several external factors which play a large influence on a country’s own development. Thereby, dependency theorists called attention to the international interconnectedness of economics, addressing the question of power and global power (im)balance in development processes.

Based on the structuralist view of international economic relations, Prebisch (1950), for instance, argues that the capitalist periphery (the “developing” or “underdeveloped” countries) is in a hierarchical economic relation with the core (the “developed” countries). Put simply, while the core exports manufactured and other high valued goods, the periphery is condemned to import those expensive goods in exchange of its cheap raw materials, in a relation of dependency, remaining “underdeveloped” as a result.

Furthermore, dependency theorist Frank (1966) maintains that the condition of underdevelopment itself was developed by capitalism, as in the world system order the world’s developed core exploits an underdeveloped periphery based on unequal exchange relations, assigning a division of labour with different positions to core and periphery respectively. Therefore, underdevelopment is neither a result of backwardness nor caused by endogenous factors, but rather a consequence of a world market process which benefits largely the world’s core. Just as underdevelopment is created through this process, Frank (1966) and other dependency theory scholars also highlight that the development of the “developed world” itself was only possible thanks to this same unequal process based on such asymmetrical power relations (Kößler 1998, Galindo 2004).

Applying dependency theory to his analysis of the African continent, Rodney (1972) dialogues with Frank (1967) and many others to explain how Africa’s “underdevelopment” is intrinsically attached to European colonialism and development. In his famous book *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, he asserts that
Mistaken interpretations of the causes of underdevelopment usually stem either from prejudiced thinking or from the error of believing that one can learn the answers by looking inside the underdeveloped economy. The true explanation lies in seeking out the relationship between Africa and certain developed countries and in recognizing that it is a relationship of exploitation. (Rodney 1972: 22).

Additionally, the author contends that

African economies are integrated into the very structure of the developed capitalist economies; and they are integrated in a manner that is unfavorable to Africa and insures that Africa is dependent on the big capitalist countries. Indeed, structural dependence is one of the characteristics of underdevelopment. (Rodney 1972: 25).

As a development strategy, dependency theory scholars suggest, for example, that underdeveloped countries should strive to break with such hierarchical dependency by reducing their links to the core. Periphery countries should strategically protect their economy through autocentric national economic growth and the increase of interregional trade within the periphery (Preston 1996, Leys 1996).

3.3 Development as discourse

From the 1990s on, scepticism concerning both development theory and development (assistance) policy echoed among social scientists. As anthropologist Escobar explains,

instead of the kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development produced its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression. The debt crisis, the Sahelian famine, increasing poverty, malnutrition, and violence are only the most pathetic signs of the failure of forty years of development. (Escobar 1995: 4).

In light of this, different scholars called attention to the necessity of critical approaches in the study of development. Mirroring the reception of the works of authors such as Foucault (e.g. 1991a, 1991b) and Said (1978), post-structuralist, post-colonial and other critical studies have striven to analyse the phenomenon of development as theory as well as discourse.

Refuting the apparent universal and common sense character of development, different authors have striven to situate the historical origins of development thinking and theory (e.g. Rist 1997, Shanin 1997, Kößler 1998, Ziai 2010, Lepenies 2008). Analysing modernization theory and Rostow’s model, these authors observe that the dominant development thinking rest on an idea of development as a unidirectional evolutional process. As Kößler (1998) explains, this derives from social evolutionist thinking, which has largely influenced social and economic sciences over the past centuries. Thus, Rostow’s (1960) attempt to explain
differences between different societies based on different stages of development mirrors such evolutionary thinking, which, at the same time affirms that all societies follow one single pattern of development, thereby confirming the superiority of modern, developed societies.

Searching for the roots of development thinking in the history of philosophy, Shanin (1997) explains that such understanding of a lineal evolution of global society is strongly linked with the idea of “progress.” “Progress,” he argues, is the core idea behind the belief that all societies are advancing from barbarism to civilization, from poverty to richness, or from underdevelopment to development. Across time, asserts Shanin (1997: 66), “the wording has changed with fashion: ‘progress’, ‘modernization’, ‘development’, ‘growth’, and so on. So did the legitimizations: ‘civilizing mission’, ‘economic efficiency’, ‘friendly advice’” or, I would add, “development assistance”. As a philosophical legacy from the 17th to the 19th centuries, the idea of progress emerges as a solution to two riddles the Europeans faced: The growing evidence of the diversity of humanity, fostered by colonialism; and the secular European linear perception of time and history, as opposed to the medieval belief in fate and static time (Shanin 1997). As the author explains,

[the idea of progress was the dramatic resolution of two great riddles by linking them. What produced diversity? The different stages of development of different societies. What was social change? The necessary advance through the different social forms that existed. What is the task of social theory? To provide an understanding of the natural sequence of stages from past to future. What is the duty of an enlightened ruler? To put to use the findings of scholars to speed up the necessary ‘advance’, fighting off regressive forces which try to stop it (Shanin 1997: 67-68).

For Shanin (1997: 66), the impact of the idea of progress or development “in part reflected the onset of the so-called ‘Industrial Revolution’, and the first flush of triumphal belief in the ceaseless production of endlessly proliferating material goods, making humanity happy.”

Dependency theorists have also been criticized by different scholars for similar reasons. Different from modernization theory, dependency theory indeed does not assume that all societies intrinsically possess the conditions for development, pointing instead to structural and power inequalities within global economic development. Although this might have been an important contribution to the development debate, Kößler (1998), Galindo (2004) and Ziai (2010) remark that dependency theorists still take the very idea of development for granted and, as such, reinforce specific standards of development of certain (Western) societies as
universal. Thereby, dependency theorists’ strategies of economic development for “underdeveloped” nations might reproduce patterns of development and modernity that do not necessarily speak for these nations. As the authors highlight, such patterns were determined by so-called developed countries and are based on the profit made through unequal relations with less developed societies.

In this sense, Menzel’s (1993 apud Ziai 2010) definition of development theory summarizes how post-colonial and post-structuralist scholars understand the overall development theory, highlighting its geographical an historical singularity:

Under development theory I understand those assertions with the help of which one justifies why in industrial societies of Western Europe, North America and East Asia economic growth, industrialisation, social differentiation and mobility, mental change, democratization and distribution took place (one calls these processes “development”), i.e. why in the rest parts of the world these processes are absent, happen incompletely or simply a caricature of these processes is present. The latter is called – depending on the analytical approach – backwardness or underdevelopment. (Menzel 1993:132 apud Ziai 2010: 40016).

Taking on Menzel’s contribution, Ziai (2010: 400) maintains that “‘development’ represents thus abstractly a set of interrelated and positively normatively charged processes, which took place in some regions and in others not.”17 As the author explains, historical, social and economic processes that happened in Europe and the European colonies of North America were elevated as historical norm. Thus, such particular historical processes appear as human historical progress, and those specific societies as ideal norm, whereas all other societies were categorized as deficient versions of that norm, or as “underdeveloped” (idem).

Similarly, Lepenies (2008) and Escobar (1995) analyse the historical origins of development departing from President Truman’s famous speech. Escobar stresses that the post-World War II context gave birth to development as theory and discourse, which happened analogously to the construction of poverty as a world problem. In this sense, development thinking in

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16 Translation mine. Original: „Ich verstehe unter Entwicklungstheorie Aussagen, mit deren Hilfe ... begründet wird, warum es in den Industriegesellschaften Westeuropas, Nordamerikas und Ostasiens zu Wirtschaftswachstum, Industrialisierung, sozialer Differenzierung und Mobilisierung, mentalem Wandel, Demokratisierung und Umverteilung gekommen ist (diese Prozesse nennt man Entwicklung) bzw. warum in den übrigen Teilen der Welt diese Prozesse ausbleiben, nur unvollständig realisiert werden oder lediglich eine Karikatur dieser Prozesse zu beobachten ist. Letzteres nennt man, je nach analytischem Zugang, Rückständigkeit oder Unterentwicklung“.

17 Translation mine. Original: „Entwicklung‘ stellt demnach abstrakt ein Bündel von miteinander verknüpften und normativ positiv aufgeladenen Prozessen dar, die in einigen Regionen stattfanden und in anderen nicht.”
general derives from the idea of opposition between “developed” and “underdeveloped,” even though the latter might have been substituted by euphemisms today. As Lepenies (2008) explains, conceiving the world through dichotomous concepts is a longstanding tradition. For the author, conceptual dichotomies,

have not only shaped the concept of development in terms of the opposition developed-underdeveloped but also that many other major characteristics of the semantics of development derive from them. To name a few: the notion that the underdeveloped can develop, that development is a process as well as a stage, that a conceptual distinction is made between the intent to develop and immanent development, that development assistance is an obligation for the developed [and] that, ideally, the path of development is laid out for all underdeveloped countries alike. (Lepenies 2008: 204).

Thus, analogous to a view that puts one’s own society as the best and the others’ as worse, development theory implies the idea that the Western world is the most developed and modern, whereas the non-Western is condemned to fit to the label of underdeveloped and traditional (Galindo 2004). As Galindo (2004:178) highlights, this ethnocentrism which underlies mainstream development thinking put the social, political and economic structures of West-European societies as the role model of modernisation and thereby did not leave any room for the conception of other forms of development or modernity.

Furthermore, Escobar (1995) argues that, at the same time “development” is formed by the dichotomy between “developed” and “underdeveloped”, it reinforces such dichotomy through the practises it implies. In order to explain how this process occurs, Escobar focus on the study of development as discourse. Taking on the Foucauldian concept of discourse, Escobar analyses rural development and nutrition programmes in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, stressing not only the construction of the concept of development, but also the consequences of its application in the practice. In his famous book Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Escobar (1995) argues that the development discourse is governed by the same principles as the colonial discourse: “it has created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World”18 (idem: 9). For the author, through the various actions

18 Also Murray Li (2007: 21) explains that in the colonial period, similar to now, a particular population’s failure in turning natural resources profitable is used by development politicians and bureaucrats as “rationales for their dispossession, and as the justification to assign resources to people who will make better use of them”. Referring to the colonial period, Drayton (2000: 55 apud Murray Li 2007: 21) called it the myth of the profligate native: “Whoever was on the spot was wasting its resources, and [...] might legitimately be expelled, or submitted to European tutelage.” For Murray Li (2007: 21), “[t]his myth is alive and well in national
motivated by it, through the form it is regulated and also through the way it represents and thus (re)creates the “Third World” (and, by opposition to it, the “First World”), the development discourse gives rise to an apparatus of certain forms of knowledge and techniques of power. In other words, development discourse and the discourses on the Third (and First) World(s) implicate certain social production of space, which is “bound with the production of differences, subjectivities, and social orders” (idem: 9). Thus, the development discourse first creates the distinction “First” versus “Third World” and, through such apparatus of knowledge and techniques of power, it maintains and reinforces this distinction.

Moreover, in the book The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power (2010), different scholars strive to deconstruct and critically analyse development, based on the examination of different terms which are central in development discourse, such as poverty, resources, needs, technology, standard of living, etc. Commenting on the emergence of the oppositional terms developed and underdeveloped, Esteva points out that,

> for two-thirds of the people on earth, this positive meaning of the word ‘development’ – profoundly rooted after two centuries of its social construction – is a reminder of what they are not. It is a reminder of an undesirable, undignified condition. To escape from it, they need to be enslaved to others’ experiences and dreams. (Esteva 2010 :5).

Concurring with Esteva, Rahnema (2010: 174) states that although poverty - a core term in development discourse - does exist, “it is also a myth, a construct and the invention of a particular civilization.” As with “development”, today’s understanding of “poverty” in the international sphere is also a relatively new historical notion. As the author Rahnema explains,

> [i]t was only after the expansion of the mercantile economy, the processes of urbanization leading to massive pauperization and, indeed, the monetization of society that the poor were defined as lacking what the rich could have in terms of money and possessions (Rahnema 2010: 175).

Thus, Rahnema (idem: 183) calls attention to the peculiarity of the notion of poverty that development and poverty-eradication programmes work with, which is also connected to a certain idea of “what one needs” and to a particular (Western) notion of people as consumers and taxpayers. Therefore, when one is not-developed, one “lacks something.” As the author

bureaucracies and transnational agencies promoting agricultural development and conservation. It continues to be used to justify dispossession.”
(idem: 176) says, “[t]he facts or materialities on which the various constructs of poverty are based are those ‘things’ the lack of which is perceived as poverty.”

Another term pointed out as fundamental to development discourse is “technology”. As Ulrich (2010: 308) states, Truman had already said in his landmark speech, that “the key to a greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge,” indicating something which has been a central strategy of international development assistance policy ever since. As Ulrich (idem) explains, with the age of development, science and technology

were regarded as the reason for the superiority of the North and the guarantee of the promise of development. As the ‘key to prosperity’ they were to open up the realm of material surplus and [...] to lead the countries of the world towards the sunny uplands of the future (Ulrich 2010: 308).

3.4 Development discourse in international development cooperation

Concerning international development cooperation specifically, there is also a growing literature that focuses on the discursive character of development. For instance, Scoones et al. (2013) underline the importance of analysing the discursive aspect of development in this field, since, in the case of any development programme, visions of “development” are often juxtaposed with imaginaries of “underdevelopment”, “backwardness” and “need”. Legitimate or not, these imaginaries become powerful and shape international development cooperation (idem).

Many case studies of development assistance programmes argue in the same direction. Wainwright’s (2008 *apud* Ziai 2010) study in Belize demonstrates how agricultural development programmes operate discursively – and what practical consequences they might have. In Wainwright’s case study, these development programmes were based on a central discursive argument that the agricultural systems of the Maya populations were primitive, inefficient and caused environmental degradation. From 1978 on, the not-so-participative development projects in Belize promoted the privatization of communal land and a more capital-intensive agriculture, which led to severe indebtedness of many farmers, causing large popular discontentment and protests (Wainwright 2008 *apud* Ziai 2010).

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19 Emphasis mine.
Mitchell’s (1995, 2002, 2009 *apud* Ziai 2010) studies on the construction of Egypt in the development discourse are also very elucidative. The author undertook an extensive analysis of World Bank’s reports on Egypt and on suggestions over development policy for the country, contrasting them with empirical data. Mitchell found that much of the World Bank’s representation of Egypt was based on false assumptions. For the author, the lack of knowledge about the Non-Western Other is a structural characteristic of the development discourse. Analysing the political background of such *misknowledge* over Egypt, he points out how Western actors working in development assistance in Egypt were themselves benefiting from the assistance they were giving. He concludes that the construction of the non-Western Other is largely shaped by the needs and interests of Western actors. Thus, in light of Mitchell’s studies, development discourse appears as factually inaccurate and guided by self-interest of those powerful actors who underline such discourse (*idem*).

Moreover, Eriksson Baaz’s (2005 *apud* Ziai 2010) study on identity making within development assistance shows how the idea of backwardness is present in the discursive construction and practice of development programmes. Based on discourse analysis of many interviews with aid workers in Tanzania, Eriksson Baaz shows how the imaginary of such workers is still filled with an us versus them construction scheme in which the Western self is believed to be superior to the backward, passive and irrational African Other. As the author (*idem*) explains, this process appears to be intrinsic to the dynamic of foreign development assistance schemes guided by the modern idea of development.

One of the most influential works on development discourse is Ferguson’s (1994) case study on the “development industry” in Lesotho. In the introduction of his book *The Anti-Politics Machine* (1994), Ferguson highlights that failure appears to be the norm or a general condition in development projects all around Africa. Therefore there exists the need to undertake a careful analysis of how they are carried out and are still discursively sustained. The anthropologist sees the term “development” as a “central organizing concept,” like “civilization” in the 19th century or “God” in the 12th. As such, it “presupposes a central, unquestionable value, with respect to which the different world views can be articulated” (*idem*: xiii). Based on ethnography of a rural development programme taking place in the 1970s and 1980s in Lesotho, Ferguson analysed how “‘development’ discourses” were
operationalized, how they produced and put development initiatives into practice, and which outcomes they ended up having. As he explains,

[the thoughts and actions of ‘development’ bureaucrats are powerfully shaped by the world of acceptable statements and utterances within which they live; and what they do and do not do is a product not only of the interests of various nations, classes, or international agencies, but also, and at the same time, of working out of this complex structure of knowledge. (Ferguson 1990: 18).]

Similarly to Mitchell’s (1995, 2002, 2009 apud Ziai 2010) study on Egypt, Ferguson (1994: 27) analysed how World Bank reports constructed an image of Lesotho as a “traditional peasant subsistence society,” with an “aboriginal economy” and “virtually untouched by modernity” – even though, according to Ferguson, any scholar would state this “would be absolutely untrue” (ibid.). The author observes that, for example, statistical data were deformed by reports just to prove the existence of an agricultural crisis. He claims that “development’ reports regularly twist their words, and often their numbers as well, to make Lesotho fit the picture of the ‘peasant society’” (Ferguson 1994: 58). In sum, in these reports,

[political and structural causes of poverty in Lesotho are systematically erased and replaced with technical ones, and the ‘modern’, capitalist, industrialized nature of the society is systematically understated or concealed. One arrives at a picture of a basically agricultural economy which, although potentially prosperous, is now producing under primitive, ancient conditions lacking basic infrastructure and modern techniques. (Ferguson 1994: 66).]

As Ferguson (1994) argues, this picture of an “underdeveloped” or, in the World Bank’s official terms by that time, “less developed” Lesotho is the basis for the argumentation in favour of development assistance strategies. These reports do not mention political or historical barriers that could be an explanation for Lesotho’s economic reality, such as its colonial past or the dictatorial government’s inaction, since, for these problems, there is no solution that development assistance could offer. For Ferguson, the discursive regime of “development” implies that Lesotho is portrayed in a particular way which fits the set of interventions that development agencies could offer: irrigation schemes, crop authorities, credit programmes, etc. All such strategies are within one particular sort of intervention: “the technical, apolitical, ‘development’ intervention” (idem: 28). Once Lesotho is constructed in such a way, this image does not only shape reports and documents but also largely influences the construction of organizations, institutions and programmes, whether by foreign development agencies or local government (idem).
Moreover, Murray Li (2007) offers an important study on governmentality and development based on her long experience within development agencies in Indonesia. Dialoguing with Ferguson (1994), she calls attention to the fact that for “development” to be translated into explicit programmes, two interconnected practices are required. One is “problematization, that is, identifying deficiencies that need to be rectified,” similarly to, for instance, the way that poverty is constructed and framed, as showed above by Rahnema (2010). As Murray Li (2007: 7) explains, “the identification of a problem is intimately linked to the availability of a solution.” The second practice is what she calls “rendering technical.” The author explains that there is a whole set of practices based on “experts’ knowledge” that frame social-political problems in technical terms. As she said commenting on experts, “[t]heir claim to expertise depends on their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solution that fall within their repertoire” (idem: 7). In sum, as Murray Li (idem) argues, in the context of development policy, a problem is identified or constructed according to an available technical solution.

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As I have striven to show in this chapter, development theory, since its emergence in the post-World War II context, has largely influenced politics and policies around the globe and, as such, played a central role in both IR theory and practice. Although notions on development might vary, for instance between modernization and dependency theories, the development ideal usually evoked by the development discourse is still one that works on the distinction between “developed” and “underdeveloped”/“developing”, oriented on standards of the Global North.
4. Methodology

For the purpose of this thesis, I conducted a single-case study in order to analyse the development approach within Brazil’s South-South cooperation development approach. I begin with an analysis of the discourse within Brazil’s South-South cooperation. Afterwards, I focus on an analysis of discourse and practice of a development cooperation programme proposed by Brazil. The selected programme was ProSAVANA, a trilateral cooperation programme implemented by Japanese, Brazilian and Mozambican governments which aims “to create new development models” for rural areas in northern Mozambique. Choosing a development cooperation program in Mozambique was not only motivated by research-related pragmatic reasons (as I speak Portuguese fluently), but also by the fact that Mozambique receives the biggest share of Brazil’s international development cooperation budget. Besides, in the international sphere, the country is considered to be one of the world’s poorest countries and also one of the biggest receivers of foreign aid and foreign investments in general (Nogueira 2014). Although such foreign flows have contributed to the country’s recent significant economic growth, statistics show that the country’s levels of poverty and malnutrition have not been declining, which, as well, makes Mozambique an interest case when examining programmes that address the issues of poverty and food security such as ProSAVANA.

Regarding the choice of the ProSAVANA programme, I firstly chose to analyse a programme related to rural development since the agricultural sector is the one that receives the highest emphasis in Brazil’s international development cooperation, much more than in the case of North-South cooperation. Among the other Brazilian agricultural development programmes in Mozambique, I chose ProSAVANA because it is the most emblematic and the most controversial as well. The programme is the most ambitious, with the vastest target area and the highest budget, and it outspokenly intends to offer a new model of development. Yet, the programme has been subject to strong criticism in Mozambique as well as worldwide and was

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20 Text 77.
21 Between 1993 and 2012, Mozambique’s GDP has grown an yearly average of 8% (Nogueira 2014: 63).
22 Between 2002/3 and 2008/9, the level of poverty went from 54,1% to 54,7% and the level of severe acute malnutrition in children went from 5,1% to 6,6% (Nogueira 2014: 63).
23 Agriculture accounted for 22% of Brazilian technical cooperation initiatives around the globe between 2003 and 2010 and for 24% in the case of Mozambique (Nogueira & Ollinaho 2013: 2).
accused of encouraging land grabbing. Mozambican social movements have firmly criticized the programme, questioning its development approach and showing preoccupation with its possible impacts and effects. Therefore, with the intention to better understand this largely understudied programme, my in-depth analysis intends as well to deepen the critical knowledge concerning ProSAVANA, contributing to those who are engaged in the programme’s formulation as well as to those engaged in criticizing it or affected by it. Furthermore, the present work intends to offer a contribution to the study of Brazil’s South-South cooperation in general.

My analysis is structured around the examination of two spheres: discourse and praxis. For the first sphere, I undertook a discourse analysis of textual material and interviews regarding the topic of Brazil’s South-South cooperation and the ProSAVANA programme. Assessing the discursive character of Brazil’s international development cooperation is crucial to understand if, how and to what extent a new notion of development is operationalised by Brazilian actors and how it affects the international cooperation praxis. As we have seen in the literature in the previous chapter, discourses shape action and, as such, play a crucial role in how international development cooperation takes place. Recalling Foucault, development assistance researcher Ferguson (1994) states that discourse is a practice, it is structured, and it has real effects which are much more profound than simply “mystification”. The thoughts and actions of “development” bureaucrats are powerfully shaped by the world of acceptable statements and utterances within which they live; and what they do and do not do is a product not only of the interests of various nations, classes, or international agencies, but also, and at the same time, of working out of this complex structure of knowledge (Ferguson 1994: 18).

For my analysis of discourse, I follow the method suggested by Hajer (1995). Also drawing from Foucault, Hajer defines discourse as a “specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995: 44 apud Schneider & Janning 2006: 180). Hajer proposes three analytical steps to examine the three different layers of a discourse within a public policy: 1) analysis of storylines and metaphors24

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24 Hajer makes a slight distinction between storylines, metaphors and myths. However, in my analysis I focus on the first two concepts. I do not make the distinction between the different myths and storylines, as, disagreeing with Hajer, I do not see any analytical advantage in the differentiation between storylines and myths. Calling a storyline a myth would be mere judgment of value, at least in the case of the present study.
in the discourse. As Hajer (idem: 181) explains, storylines “help people to fit their bit of knowledge, experience or expertise into the larger jigsaw of a policy debate”; 2) examination of the policy vocabulary; and 3) reconstruction of *epistemic figures*, which are composed of more basic and deeper structures of thinking that have a major influence in the discourse.\(^{25}\) In the present work, the first two steps are presented in the following two chapters, while the third is presented at the final discussion.

Furthermore, the second sphere of analysis in the present work is the praxis of Brazil’s South-South cooperation. For this, I examine how the ProSAVANA programme has been taking place, how it has been implemented, which are its strategies and how the programme’s notions of development are being applied in the field. Inspired by Mayring’s (2008) methodology, I undertake an analysis of official documents and interviews that I conducted not only with governmental actors but also with social movements representatives and other experts. In addition, I complement my data with secondary literature on the topic.

Conducting interviews with actors other than those responsible for ProSAVANA’s formulation and implementation was motivated by my intent to examine the programme beyond official speech. Besides, civil society actors have played a limited but active role in criticizing and influencing the policy making process, and, together with governmental experts working in other programmes than ProSAVANA, offered a differentiated critical perspective on the programme, helping me to unveil its discourse and assess its praxis. Thus, such broad analysis of the ProSAVANA programme enables me to examine discrepancies between discourse and praxis and, thereby, contribute to apprehend Brazil’s South-South cooperation approach from and beyond its discursive character.

The interviews were conducted mainly during two research stays, the first in Brasilia, Brazil (April 2014) and the second in Maputo, Mozambique (between October and December 2014).\(^{26}\) All 22 interviews were semi-structured and conducted personally, except two which were conducted via phone and Skype. With the exception of two,\(^ {27}\) all interviews were

\(^{25}\) For example, the idea of nature conservation and the idea of nature development are part of two different epistemic figures, with two very different general assumptions on the concept of nature.

\(^{26}\) For the research stays, I was provided funding by the University of Potsdam and by the Free University Berlin.

\(^{27}\) Two interviewees preferred not to have their interview recorded.
recorded and, for the most part, transcribed. In total, I conducted 22 interviews with 34 people from 20 different organizations. The interview partners can be divided into three groups: 1) ProSAVANA interviewees: members of institutions directly responsible for ProSAVANA’s formulation and/or implementation; 2) civil society interviewees: representatives of social movements and civil society organizations which are engaged in the discussion on ProSAVANA; 3) experts working on the issue of food security in Mozambique, who are not working within ProSAVANA but for another Brazilian development cooperation programme.

In the interviews with representatives of institutions responsible for the ProSAVANA programme, I explored different topics concerning the programme’s conception, formulation, implementation and evaluation. By the end of the interviews, I asked the interviewees about their understanding of some key notions related to the concept of development which they mentioned, such as regional development, sustainable development and development itself. During my research stay in Brazil, I interviewed four representatives from the following institutions: Brazilian Agency Cooperation (ABC), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural Research (Embrapa) and Mozambican Embassy. In Mozambique, I conducted interviews with five members of the following institutions: ABC, JICA, Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and the Brazilian Embassy.

The interviews with civil society actors followed a similar structure, with more emphasises on their activity regarding the ProSAVANA programme, and on their suggestions concerning approaches for better life conditions in rural Mozambique. I also asked the interviewees about their views on the notion of development. During my research stay in Mozambique, I interviewed 18 members of ten different movements and organizations, such as environmental NGOs JA!–Environmental Justice and Livaningo, National Peasants Union (UNAC – União Nacional dos Camponeses), land rights organization Rural Association for Mutual Support (ORAM - Organização Rural de Ajuda Mútua) and rural development NGO Kulima.

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28 See Appendix A for transcribed interviews and interview notes.
29 For a complete list of interviews and interview partners’ institutions, see Appendix A.
Finally, the interviews with the third group were conducted with a professor who is an expert on rural issues in Mozambique and with six workers and coordinators of the programme Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA). This small budget programme is also a Brazilian development cooperation programme that addresses the issues of food security and rural development, but with a very different approach from ProSAVANA’s. Therefore, interviewing experts that work on the same issues but with different strategies contributes to the discussion of ProSAVANA’s discursive construction and praxis. During my research stay in Mozambique, I interviewed coordinators of the PAA programme at Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP), three PAA promoters at the Mozambican Ministry of Education and, afterwards via Skype, a representative of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affair’s General Coordination Office for International Action Against Hunger (CG Fome).

Additionally, my data was completed by rich text material. I collected and analysed texts spanning the time period of 2003 to 2014 from Brazilian institutions in charge of the ProSAVANA programme, which were: Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ press; Brazilian Presidency (Planalto Palace) press; Embrapa’s press; the ABC website; consultancy FGV Projetos’ website; and ProSAVANA’s official website. Thereby, I collected all texts mentioning at least one of the terms: “ProSAVANA,” “South-South cooperation” and “Mozambique.” In addition, for the analysis of ProSAVANA’s praxis I also used official documents related to the programme’s implementation, such as its master plan. All data, including the interviews, was inductively codified and analysed with help of the qualitative analysis software atlas.ti. All interviews, press texts and official documents mentioned throughout this thesis will be referenced according to reference number given in Appendixes A and B.

30 In short, PAA Africa promotes agro-ecological and sustainable agricultural methods and focuses on community development by purchasing food crops from peasants and distributing them to local schools. PAA Africa was inspired by a rural development programme with the same abbreviation in Brazil, the Food Procurement Programme (Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos - PAA), which was born out of a demand of Brazilian social movements linked to peasantry and agro-ecology. In Mozambique, the PAA Africa is implemented by FAO and WFP.

31 See Appendixes A and B for detailed references.
5. The discursive construction of Brazil’s South-South cooperation

In the analysis of texts of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s and Presidency official press texts, official documents related to the ProSAVANA programme, and interviews with Brazilian actors, I could identify some central discursive elements sustaining the idea of Brazil’s international development cooperation. In these texts, different storylines and metaphors form and articulate discourses on development and international cooperation, thereby promoting Brazil’s South-South cooperation model. Here, the following main storylines are evoked: exhaustion of the models of the Global North; emergence of the Global South; the need of strengthening the Global South; Brazil and Africa together in a fight for a fairer international order; affinity between Brazil and Africa; Brazil as a friend/brother who helps those who need.

At the core of Brazil’s discourse on South-South cooperation, there is the storyline of exhaustion of the models of the Global North. Appearing in different speeches by Brazilian politicians and policy makers, this storyline can be observed especially after beginning of the global financial crisis in the late 2000s. For instance, President Rousseff proclaimed at the 2013 South America–Africa Summit that

\[
\text{in contrast with the international scenario of economic-financial crisis, which at this moment affects Europe in a more acute way [...] our continents [South America and Africa] have experienced in the last years considerable dynamism with sustained growth [...] and poverty reduction rates.}
\]

Two years before, at another South-America–Africa Summit, President Rousseff’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Patriota held an emblematic speech. He proclaimed:

\[
\text{In a world where we watch the exhaustion of development models conceived by the North, and whose developed economies are facing their own crises, South America and Africa rise from decades of stagnation and conflict toward a new cycle of prosperity and emancipation. [...] Part of this emancipation process involves the capability to overcome relationship patterns between our regions and other regions of the world via the developed world and the former colonial powers. History brought us closer through slavery and ties with former powers distant from our material and human realities. Today, we can make history establishing direct trade, cooperation and diplomatic and political coordination ties. Brazil is willing to take on its responsibility.}
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32 Translation mine. Original: “Em contraste com o cenário internacional de crise econômico-financeira, que neste momento atinge de forma mais aguda a Europa, a chamada Zona do Euro, nossos continentes têm experimentado, nos últimos anos, considerável dinamismo com taxas de crescimento sustentadas, aumento da renda e redução da pobreza.” (Texts 27 and 35).

33 Text 31.
As both President Rousseff’s and her Foreign Minister’s speeches demonstrate, such a storyline of *exhausting models of the Global North* is directly connected to a storyline of the *emergence of the Global South*. As the analysis of the material shows, this storyline is central to the general Brazilian foreign policy discourse, particularly in the promotion of Brazilian international development cooperation. It narrates the economic and political emergence of nations of the Global South. Similarly, Rousseff also proclaimed in the South America-Africa Summit that

> [t]he time in which we [South America and Africa] were part of a distant, silent, quiet and problematic *periphery* is gone. The *developing world* became vital for the global economy and responds for more than half of the [global] economic growth and for more than 40% of the investment, on a global scale.\(^{34}\)

In connection to such storylines, different speeches and other texts also evoke a storyline that argues for *the need of strengthening the Global South*, calling for an intensification of the South-South relations and for a model of international development based on the interests of those countries. According to this storyline, there is a need to gain more economic and political independence from the North, and to reinforce South-South trade and cooperation. Besides having been strongly proclaimed by both Brazilian Presidents Lula and Rousseff and their Foreign Relations Ministers in various occasions, such storylines were also present in the interviews I conducted with employees of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency.\(^{35}\)

In general, Brazil’s South-South cooperation is discursively sustained by the promotion of an ideal of development that conforms to the reality of the Global South. For example, in 2003, on occasion of one of Lula’s first visits to Africa, a report by the press of Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “Brazilian government’s proposals” of cooperation programmes “envisioned creating better conditions of development for developing countries.”\(^{36}\)\(^{37}\) On several occasions, Brazilian governmental actors evoked the storyline that *Brazil and Africa*

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\(^{34}\) Translation and emphases mine. Original: “Foi-se o tempo em que nós éramos parte de uma periferia distante, silenciosa ou calada e problemática. O mundo em desenvolvimento tornou-se vital para a economia global, e já responde por mais da metade do crescimento econômico, e por mais de 40% do investimento em escala mundial” (Texts 27 and 35).

\(^{35}\) Interviews 1, 5 and 7.

\(^{36}\) Translation mine. Original: “propostas que o Governo brasileiro está apresentando com vistas à criação de melhores condições de desenvolvimento para os países em desenvolvimento” (Text 23).

\(^{37}\) Also in the case of Mozambique, the notion of development is generally very present in the discourse of Brazil’s South-South cooperation. For instance, in two different speeches directed to the Mozambican head of state, Lula affirmed that Mozambique was “on the right way of development” (Text 10). In a similar context, linking the post-civil war context in Mozambique to the notion of development, Lula stated a few times that “there is no peace without development” (Text 25).
are together in a fight for a fairer international order. For example, President Lula affirmed in at least three different speeches38 that both Brazil and Mozambique were in “a fight for more fairness and equality” in global trade, stressing the importance of coordinating actions among developing states and arguing for an international development on equal and fair conditions for the Global South.

Moreover, the emergence of Brazil’s South-South cooperation in Africa is discursively sustained by a series of storylines and metaphors, which emphasize the affinity between Brazil and Africa. As mentioned in various documents and by Brazilian interviewees, Brazil and Africa allegedly have a very close affinity in terms of history, culture, geography. In this context, President Lula and other Brazilian actors stressed that Brazil “is the country with the largest population of African descendants outside Africa and the country with the second largest population of African origin.”39 Following their argumentation, Brazil’s foreign policy turn to Africa in the Lula era is a search of “its origins and roots” on the other side of the South Atlantic and more than ever a recognition both of “the African contribution to Brazilian identity” and that Brazil has a “moral and historical duty” towards the continent.4041 The metaphor of “the Atlantic Ocean bringing us together,”42 which is connected both to the slave-trade to Brazil in the past and to Brazil-Africa relations of today, is also often operationalized. The fact that Brazil and African countries were colonized is also evoked as a point of affinity. Moreover, development also appears as a central argument for the alleged affinity between Brazil and Africa: the proximity between Africa and Brazil in terms of “stage of economic and social development”43 is very often called upon to justify Brazil’s development programmes in Africa or, as it is recurrently emphasized, for “Africa’s interest in Brazilian cooperation.” As an interviewee at the Brazilian Cooperation Agency put it, African countries search for experiences legitimately of countries with proximate stage of development [...]. So Brazil is recognized as a country which overcame great

38 In one of them, Lula also thanked Mozambique for supporting Brazil’s plea for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Text 4).
39 Text 31.
40 Text 17.
41 Lula’s presidential ascension in 2003 was also marked by the participation of social movements related to the “Black cause” in the formulation of a new “racial policy” in the federal government.
42 Text 31.
43 Text 22.
challenges [...] and that attracts the interest of these African countries so that also the Brazilian cooperation helps them finding solutions.44

Furthermore, Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim alleged that, “in all African countries [he] passed by [...], there is a hunger for Brazil.”45 Articulating many of the storylines above, he argued for Brazil’s cooperation with African states in the following statement:

the interest that Brazil awakes in Africa is huge. [...] it is a gaze to a country that they consider close, not just for the ethnical composition, but also for its level of development; close, but which has already given more advanced steps in many sectors in which they are still beginning, in some cases. [...]. There is a huge interest in having Brazil as a part in this economic development that is happening in Africa. [...] All [African countries visited] have a great expectation that Brazil makes itself present. [...]. What I felt was ‘hunger’ for cooperation with Brazil, for the reasons I pointed out.46

Notwithstanding such focus on South-South horizontality and affinity, the discourse of Brazil’s South-South cooperation also relies on an idea of assistance. In the analysed texts, it has been asserted that Brazil has to offer its hand for those who need it. For example, President Lula proclaimed during the visit of Mozambican President in 2004 “Brazil, for what it represents, must always give the example of extending a hand for those who most need it.”47 Dressing up such principle of solidarity metaphorically, Brazilian actors often state that Brazil is a “brother” or a “friend” to other Southern countries48. For example, President Lula mentioned “our Mozambican brothers” in several speeches49. Besides, the relation between Brazil and African countries, especially, was often described by terms such as friendship and fraternity.

Overall, within the vocabulary used in the discursive construction, the following key-words are central: alliance, bilateral treaty, dialogue, exchange, help, know-how exchange, partner, partnership, solidarity, solidarity diplomacy, south-south, technical capacitation, technical

44 Translation mine. Original: “buscarem experiências legitimamente de países com estágios de desenvolvimento próximo [...]. Então o Brasil é reconhecido como um país que superou grandes desafios [...]. E isso atrai o interesse desses países africanos para que também a cooperação brasileira os ajude na busca das suas... de soluções” (Interview 1).
45 Translation mine. Original: “Eu senti por todos os países pelos quais passei na África, não só nos de língua portuguesa, que existe uma fome de Brasil” (Text 17).
46 Translation mine. Original: “o interesse que o Brasil desperta na África é enorme [...]. É um olhar voltado para um país que eles consideram próximo, não só por sua composição étnica, mas também pelo seu grau de desenvolvimento; próximo, mas que já deu passos mais avançados em vários setores em que eles ainda estão, em alguns casos, começando. Essa é a visão geral. [...]. Mas há também um enorme interesse em ter o Brasil como participe desse desenvolvimento econômico que está ocorrendo na África. [...] Então, o que senti foi uma ‘fome’ de cooperação com o Brasil pelas razões que aponte” (Text 17).
47 Translation mine. Original: “Porque eu acho que o Brasil, pelo que representa, precisa estar sempre dando o exemplo de estendimento de mão àqueles que mais precisam” (Text 9).
48 See e.g. Text 17.
49 See e.g. Texts 5 and 10.
cooperation, development cooperation, development, cooperation. Throughout all analysed data, the two latter – development and cooperation – were by far the most mentioned words: over 400 and 500 times, respectively.

In short, Brazil’s South-South cooperation is discursively constructed by its promoters through storylines and metaphors, which emphasize the need of strengthening of the Global South, moving away from dependency from the Global North and its old development models. In the context of the cooperation with African states, Brazil’s South-South cooperation is rhetorically sustained around the notions of fraternity, partnership and solidarity, as well as on different storylines and metaphors which focus on (geographic, economic, historical, cultural and moral) affinities between Brazil and Africa. Last but not least, Brazil’s South-South cooperation is rhetorically portrayed as demand-driven, as its promoters emphasize how African countries seek Brazilian development know-how. In this sense, Brazil’s South-South is discursively presented as an offer of a new development approach that is guided by mutual interests of nations of the Global South.
6. The ProSAVANA programme

Inspired by the story of success of the Japanese agricultural development cooperation in Brazil in the 1970s, the idea of the ProSAVANA programme emerged from dialogues between Brazilian and Japanese governments and from the Brazilian presidential diplomacy in Mozambique. In 2005, Brazilian, Japanese and Mozambican governments signed the first official agreement on the “Programme on Triangular Cooperation for Tropical Savannah Agricultural Development in Mozambique,” or ProSAVANA. With an initial target area of 14.5 million hectares in the region known as Nacala Corridor (See Figure 2) and a preliminary budget of at least US$36 million over an initial 20-year timeframe, ProSAVANA is currently the largest international cooperation rural development programme in Africa, and Brazil’s biggest development cooperation programme (Nogueira & Ollinaho 2013).

Figure 2 - Nacala Corridor and ProSAVANA’s target area. Source: Beck 2013.
In line with the Brazilian South-South cooperation approach, ProSAVANA aims to work through a new development framework in northern Mozambique. According to its official website, the programme envisions the “[improvement] of the livelihood of inhabitants of Nacala Corridor through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional development.”

It has two missions: “1. Improve and modernise agriculture to increase productivity and production, and diversify agricultural production. 2. Create employment through agricultural investment and establishment of a supply chain.”

ProSAVANA’s goal is to “create new agricultural development models, taking into account the natural environment and socio-economic aspects, and seeking market-oriented agricultural/rural/regional development with a competitive edge.”

The ProSAVANA programme has three main phases: 1) ProSAVANA Research, 2) ProSAVANA Master plan, and 3) ProSAVANA Rural Extension and Models. The first phase took place between 2010 and 2015 and was mainly conducted by Japanese consultants and Embrapa, in partnership with the Mozambican Institute for Agrarian Research. Working from different experimental farms, Brazilian experts from Embrapa as well as Japanese and Mozambican researchers have been testing and adapting different crops, especially soybean, maize, beans and cotton, which shall be produced at a later point within the programme. The second component was primarily led by the Brazilian consultancy FGV Projetos and encompasses the formulation of a master plan for the target area, including the planning of all infrastructure, logistic and operational tasks and interventions necessary for the programme’s implementation. The first draft of the master plan was finished in 2013, but as it was leaked and strongly criticized by various civil society actors it went through a lengthy revision by Japanese consultants. A new draft was finally presented to the public in March 2015, and it is currently in the process of discussion in public hearings. Finally, the third component is currently about to be launched and will consist of putting into practice the agricultural

50 Text 77.
51 Idem.
52 Idem.
As interviewees explained, different modalities of production schemes will be set in place, such as production in cooperatives and, in particular, contract farming schemes, thereby linking local farmers and investors. Special attention will be paid to establishing agro-processing and value chain schemes.

As stated above, ProSAVANA became a target of strong criticism from international and national press and civil society. Especially since the leaking of the first draft of the programme’s master plan in 2009, civil society actors have systematically reproached the programme, contending that the programme might imply many negative impacts, such as land grabbing, landlessness and environmental degradation. Additionally, international and Mozambican civil society actors accused the programme of being mainly motivated by possible economic and political interests of Brazilian, Japanese and other foreign actors. Overall, critics of ProSAVANA doubt that its development approach can benefit Mozambique’s rural population.

In the following sections, I present an analysis of the ProSAVANA programme, focusing on conception and application of the notion of development that it implies. For this, I have examined both the discursive construction of this international development cooperation programme and its application in the field. First, I present how ProSAVANA is discursively constructed in terms of the problems it addresses, or, in other words, which and how such problems are identified by those proposing the programme, and second, how the proposed solutions are discursively presented. Thirdly, I present some insights on the programme’s practice and in the final part of this analysis I intend to shed light on discrepancies between discourse and practice.

6.1 Constructing the problem

Discursively, the ProSAVANA programme is justified as a response to a series of interrelated problems concerning “(under)development”. Thereby, the main problems addressed by the programme’s discourse are food insecurity, poverty and agricultural inefficiency. The first is evoked not only as an issue within Mozambican society but also as a global concern. In

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54 Interview 6.
55 Text 78.
justification of the conception of the programme, different Brazilian actors narrated storylines of global overpopulation and global food insecurity. For instance, in a letter meant to still any doubts about ProSAVANA, the FGV director, who is responsible for the execution of the programme’s master plan, opens his text with the following statement: “In 2012 the world reached the mark of 7 billion inhabitants. After this news, there was an endless number of articles on how to feed all this population, each day more urbanized and with growing income.”\textsuperscript{56} He continues the letter with a hint for a solution: “In all the debates, there was a common point: Brazil’s role as possessor of tropical agricultural technology and Africa as new agricultural frontier.”\textsuperscript{57}

Similarly, President Lula stated in a ceremony with the Mozambican President in 2004 that food insecurity is “the biggest challenge in international security,” as “hunger is the biggest weapon of mass destruction.”\textsuperscript{58} In addition, at a business conference in 2010 in Zambia, he affirmed that

\begin{quote}
[1]he world is going to need more food in the 21th century [...], and when we look at the world map, we see there are not many places that can produce the quantity of food the world needs to consume. [...] The rich world has basically overcome its productive capacity to guarantee its food security. Looking at the world map, where do we notice land? It is in the African continent, it is in the Latin American continent [...].\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

Another main problem addressed by ProSAVANA is agricultural inefficiency. Completing the picture of food insecurity and rural poverty, the discourse around this development cooperation places a strong focus on the storyline that Mozambican agriculture is inefficient. For instance, in an interview a representative of JICA in Brazil said that the agriculture in Mozambique is “25, 30 years backwards”\textsuperscript{60} compared to the Brazilian agricultural sector.

\textsuperscript{56} Translation mine. Original: “Em 2012, o mundo atingiu a marca de 7 bilhões de habitantes. Seguiu-se à notícia um número infindável de artigos acerca de como alimentar toda esta população, cada dia mais urbanizada e com renda crescente.” (Text 43).

\textsuperscript{57} Translation mine. Original: “Em todos os debates, houve um ponto em comum: o papel do Brasil como detentor de tecnologia agrícola tropical e a África como nova fronteira agrícola.” (Text 43).

\textsuperscript{58} Translation mine. Original: “maior desafio de segurança internacional - a segurança alimentar”; “a maior das armas de destruição em massa [...] é a fome.” (Text 6).

\textsuperscript{59} Translation mine. Original: “O mundo vai precisar no século XXI de mais alimentos, o mundo vai precisar no século XXI de mais minério de todos os tipos, e quando a gente olha o mapa do mundo, a gente percebe que não tem muitos lugares que possam produzir a quantidade de alimentos que o mundo precisa consumir. [...] o mundo rico já tem praticamente superada a sua capacidade produtiva para garantir a sua segurança alimentar. Olhando o mapa do mundo, onde a gente percebe que tem terra? É no continente africano e no continente latino-americano [...].” (Text 33).

\textsuperscript{60} Translation mine. Original: “25, 30 anos atrasada” (Interview 2).
Similarly, an ABC coordinator stressed that “the demand” that resulted from ProSAVANA departs from Mozambique’s will to improve their agriculture and “overcome this condition of agricultural inefficiency.”  

In addition, an Embrapa interviewee affirmed that the problem of low agricultural efficiency in Mozambique is caused by several factors related to the lack of modern agricultural technology, such as machinery, genetic selection and production of seeds, irrigation, etc.

In addition, this problem has also been represented visually throughout texts related to ProSAVANA. A photo that was repeatedly used illustrates the “agricultural problem” in Mozambique: it displays a woman, in peasant-like clothing, manually harvesting corn in a dry field, without any indication of her name or location (see Figure 3 below). Embrapa used this photo in two different news reports on agreements on research and technology transfer in the context of ProSAVANA in 2009 and 2010.

Figure 3 – Photo used by Embrapa to depict Mozambican agriculture (Texts 48 and 62).

Sustaining the storylines above, actors and texts related to ProSAVANA often mention indexes on food and nutrition security and development, which usually place the Mozambique among the worst nations in the world. For instance, the poverty level in Mozambique was at 54.7% in 2008-2009, while the country’s current Human Development Index is 0.393, occupying the

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61 Emphasis and translation mine. Original: “superar essa condição de ineficiência agrícola”.

62 As he explained in the interview, all these issues are being addressed by ProSAVANA and other international development programmes in which Embrapa participates in Mozambique. On a side note, the interviewee commented that another main problem of the agriculture in Mozambique is an agrarian one. As he explained, rural land in Mozambique is predominantly occupied by small farmers, and, thus, there is difficulty in establishing modern, large extent agriculture (Interview 3).

178th position among all 187 countries (Nogueira 2014). In addition, statistics proving low agricultural productivity in Mozambique are also often evoked. It was mentioned that, according to a study, the situation even worsened in the 2000s, as both food per capita and food per hectare in 2008 were even lower than in 2002 (apud Nogueira & Ollinaho 2013).

In terms of the discourse vocabulary, the problems addressed by ProSAVANA are usually stressed in connection with other terms indicating a solution. For instance, the problem of agricultural inefficiency is often referred to in connection to low efficiency and other terms complementing the words lack of: lack of technology, lack of machinery, lack of infrastructure, lack of investments. Similarly, food insecurity and poverty, are often stressed in connection with a more positive term indicating the solution: poverty eradication, increase of food security, or fight against hunger and poverty. The latter is especially present in the vocabulary of Lula, Rousseff and their foreign ministers.

Overall, in the discursive construction of the ProSAVANA programme, the problems of food and nutrition security, poverty and agricultural inefficiency are evoked in a casual relation, forming the picture of Mozambique’s underdevelopment. Thereby, agricultural inefficiency is presented as the main or only trigger of lack of food and thus malnutrition, as well as being responsible for the issue of rural poverty in Mozambique.

6.2 Constructing the solution

The ProSAVANA programme is discursively constructed as a solution to a series of interrelated problems related to underdevelopment in Mozambique. As stated above, the main problems identified are food insecurity, poverty and agricultural inefficiency. The latter is presented as the main trigger of the first two. Accordingly, ProSAVANA’s discourse focuses on increasing agricultural efficiency as the key solution for all these problems. According to its official website, ProSAVANA’s number one mission is to “[i]mprove and modernise agriculture to increase productivity and production.” In addition, the terms “agricultural development” and “poverty-reduction, food security and nutrition” are also stressed in the list of the

64 *Fight against hunger and fight against poverty* were the main motto of Lula’s and Dilma’s administrations. For instance, Dilma’s first mandate slogan read: “A rich country is a country with no poverty”. Dilma’s and, especially, Lula’s governments are recognized for expanding the national social welfare system and significantly reducing food insecurity and poverty levels.

65 Text 77.
In line with Brazil’s South-South cooperation discourse, the ProSAVANA programme aims to offer a different notion of development for Mozambique. As stated in its official website, ProSAVANA’s goal is to “[c]reate new agricultural development models, [...] seeking market-oriented agricultural/rural/regional development with a competitive edge.”

In order to sustain the discursive construction of ProSAVANA’s solutions, the following main storylines are evoked by promoters of the programme: success of the green revolution and of Brazil and Japan’s cooperation in the context of agricultural development in Brazil; similarities between the Brazilian cerrado and northern Mozambique; Brazil possess knowledge of agricultural development; agricultural development can only be achieved with support of private investments; Brazilian entrepreneurs should invest in Africa; ProSAVANA is the best solution available.

In general, Brazilian actors evoke a storyline that alleges success of the green revolution that took place in Brazil from the 1970s onwards. According this storyline, this phenomenon of modernization and increase of use of technology in agriculture led to an increase in productivity and transformed the Brazilian cerrado region, with help from the Japanese cooperation’s programme Prodecer. This argument is especially presented in the context of the formulation of ProSAVANA, pointing to the achievements of both Brazilian agricultural development model and Brazil and Japan’s cooperation. For instance, an Embrapa interviewee stated that ProSAVANA “has a philosophy based on the success of the bilateral cooperation between Brazil and Japan in the development of the Brazilian cerrado through Prodecer.” Commenting on such “agricultural development success,” the interviewee explained that, in comparison with the time prior of Prodecer, today Brazilian cerrado farmers possess “[US$ 50,000] ranger trucks,” “modern agricultural machines with air-conditioned cabin, precision mechanization, global positioning system control” and “houses and apartments in Miami.”

66 Ibid.
67 Translation mine. Original: “tem uma filosofia a partir do sucesso da cooperação bilateral entre Brasil e Japão no desenvolvimento do cerrado brasileiro através do projeto Prodecer” (Interview 3).
68 Translation mine. Original: “caminhonete ranger de 150 mil reais”, “máquinas agrícolas modernas com cabine de ar-condicionado, mecanização de precisão, controle por sistema de posicionamento global”, “casa e apartamentos em Miami” (Interview 3).
In addition to this storyline, different Brazilian actors narrate a storyline that argues that the Brazilian cerrado and northern Mozambique are geographically very similar. For instance, an Embrapa interviewee pointed out on a world map how Brazil’s cerrado region and northern Mozambique both have the same latitude. Thus, according this storyline, since northern Mozambique’s geography is so similar to the Brazilian cerrado, there should be no difficulties in what Brazilian consultancy FGV Projetos’ terms, “transferring Brazilian know-how on agribusiness”69 to ProSAVANA’s target area, thereby modernizing and transforming it.

At the same time, ProSAVANA is backed by a storyline that argues that Brazil possess knowledge of agricultural development, especially in the field of “tropical agriculture.” Different interviewees and texts underline Embrapa’s key-role in ProSAVANA’s research phase and its important contribution to agricultural development in Brazil. Thereby, the guiding principles of Brazil’s South-South cooperation such as solidarity and partnership are also evoked. For instance, in a speech on the occasion of a visit of the Mozambican President, President Lula himself said: “Brazil has the technology and can help a lot a country like Mozambique to develop, as we have done, with soybean.”70 These principles are also translated visually: several news reports on cooperation agreements in the context of the programme are illustrated with pictures of meetings between Japanese, Brazilian and Mozambican policymakers and bureaucrats71. In addition, FGV Projetos stated in a text on its international projects on tropical agriculture that “Brazilians know how to do it.”72 The Brazilian consultancy defines ProSAVANA’s goal in one sentence: “to transfer Brazilian know-how on agribusiness by providing technical support to increase agricultural productivity in the Nacala Corridor […], thereby contributing to the country’s food security and the competitiveness of its rural sector.”73 In contrast to the picture of “African agricultural problem” mentioned in the previous section (Figure 3), FGV Projetos has recurrently used the following picture (Figure 4) in texts that describe the ProSAVANA programme and its other international projects for agricultural development:

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69 Text 43.
70 Translation mine. Original: “o Brasil tem tecnologia e pode ajudar muito um país como Moçambique a se desenvolver, como temos, na questão da soja” (Text 9).
71 See e.g. Texts 63 and 71.
72 Text 40.
73 Emphasis mine. Text 41.
Figure 4 – Photo by FGV depicting Brazilian developed agriculture (Texts 40 and 42).

As an illustration of the Brazilian expertise in the agricultural field, the use of this photo shows that the ideal of agricultural development as “Brazilians do it” is of a mechanized, vast monoculture plantation.

All these storylines sustain ProSAVANA’s mission of modernizing Mozambican agriculture, in order to increase productivity and thus solve the problems triggered by low agricultural efficiency. In sum, Brazilian expertise on modern, tropical agriculture should contribute to achieving ProSAVANA’s goal of creating “new development models.” In this regard, it is generally asserted that ProSAVANA will come up with a differentiated agricultural development model for Mozambique.

As indicated by ProSAVANA’s goal, it is argued that the programme will seek market-oriented development. As an ABC interviewee stressed,74 regardless whether the destination of ProSAVANA’s agricultural production will be local or transnational markets, such market-oriented development will lead to job creation, increase of income of Mozambican farmers and contribute to nutritional and food security in Mozambique. In addition, different actors

74 Interview 1.
argue that ProSAVANA’s market-oriented development will link local producers and international investors. In this regard, ProSAVANA promoters usually carefully operationalize a storyline that states *agricultural development can only be achieved with support of private investments*. For instance, when directly asked in the interview if there was no participation of private actors, an ABC coordinator took a break in his until then eloquent speech, took off his glasses, scratched his eyes, took a big breath and then explained, in a tired and paused tone, that

> ProSAVANA will have to [...] necessarily... count with private investments. So, one cannot make investment in capacitation and in improvement of productive processes if one does not think about markets. [...] Thus, ProSAVANA will have to attract or at least get in sight of local or international [private] actors [...].

In general, governmental actors stress that ProSAVANA is not motivated by or tied to private economic interests. Nonetheless, on the Brazilian side, Brazil’s South-South cooperation principle of mutual interest is not hidden. Especially in business-oriented events and in statements for the Brazilian public, the programme is often framed in terms of its possible benefits for investors.\(^{\text{76}}\) At Brazil-Africa business conventions, for instance, Lula and other Brazilian government actors evoked a storyline that stresses that *Brazilian entrepreneurs could obtain significant economic gains when investing in Africa*.\(^{\text{77}}\) In this context, ProSAVANA is presented as an opportunity for investment in Mozambique with less costs and risks for Brazilian investors.\(^{\text{78}}\) Therefore, when presented to and by Brazilian agribusiness actors, the programme is based on a vocabulary with the following key-words: *ability to compete, agribusiness, business, funding, great investments, opportunities, potentials, productive investments*.

More generally, the terminology of the discursive construction of the solutions proposed by ProSAVANA is marked by following key-terms: *hunger eradication, food security, food sovereignty, poverty reduction, fight against poverty, fight against hunger, fight for*

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\(^{\text{75}}\) Translation mine. Original: “O ProSAVANA ele terá que [...] necessariamente que...contar com investimentos privados. Então, não dá pra fazer investimento em capacitação, melhoria dos processos produtivos, se você não pensar em mercados. [...] Então o PROSAVANA precisava atrair ou pelo menos entrar na visão dos atores locais ou internacionais” (Interview 1).

\(^{\text{76}}\) See e.g. Texts 33 and 73.

\(^{\text{77}}\) See e.g. Text 33.

\(^{\text{78}}\) Extra-officially, the programme is connected to an investment fund elaborated as well by FGV Projetos. The Nacala Fund was launched in 2011 and aims to raise US$ 2 billion in 10 years to finance agribusiness investors in Northern Mozambique (Nogueira & Ollinaho 2013).
development, modernization, increase of productivity, increase of agricultural efficiency, technology, technical capacitation, investments, development, sustainable development, rural development, agricultural development, regional development, cooperation.

Moreover, when asked about their opinion concerning the critiques on the programme, ProSAVANA interviewees used the argumentation that despite its possible faults, *ProSAVANA is still the best solution available*. This appears to be a growing storyline in face of the criticism the programme has been facing since 2009. For example, an ABC coordinator said in an interview that since the Nacala Corridor already receives a lot of attention from international capital, “not making ProSAVANA is a much higher risk than the economic or groups of interest’s pressure which could distort the development of the region.” In the same line of argumentation, an employee of the Mozambican Embassy stated in an interview that “now Brazil needs to enter Africa, because if it does not, others will.”

6.3 The practice of ProSAVANA

In its discourse, ProSAVANA is presented with the main goal of “[creating] new agricultural development models.” Concerning the programme’s practice, it is still rather unclear which form such new development models will take. When asked about it, interviewees justify this lack of clarity with the incipiency of the programme’s implementation and argue that ProSAVANA endeavours to formulate new models that still have not been tested elsewhere. Nonetheless, an analysis of ProSAVANA’s measures and strategies indicated by official documents and interviewees may provide insight into how the programme applies its goals in the practice.

The preliminary master plan points out some concrete, new measures for Mozambique’s agricultural development. The master plan’s concept note focuses on the notion of “a new farming strategy, which aims at increasing crop production through improvement soil fertility

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79 Interviews 1 and 4.
80 Interview 1.
81 Translation mine. Original: “não fazer o PROSAVANA, é um risco muito maior de que a pressão econômica ou de grupos de interesse possa desvirtuar o desenvolvimento da região” (Interview 1).
82 Translation mine. Original: “Agora o Brasil precisa entrar, porque se não entra, vão entrar os outros” (Interview 4).
83 Text 77.
The main measures recommended by the master plan in order to “facilitate the [agricultural] change” are:

(i) Improvement of individual farmer’s land rights […]
(ii) Provision of incentives to farmers to facilitate the transition from shifting cultivation to settled farming […]
(iii) Development and dissemination of improved farming technology to support the transition
(iv) Increased accessibility to affordable agricultural inputs, especially quality seeds and chemical fertilizers
(v) Improvement of a market information system accessible by farmers
(vi) Establishment of micro financing/credit systems targeting general farmers

As the first two measures of this list demonstrate, clarification of land tenure and shift to settled farming are central strategies of ProSAVANA. According to the programme’s master plan, such measures might not only lead to intensification of cultivation, but also “facilitate the identification of areas for the promotion of agriculture by large farmers, private companies and medium scale farmers with leading experience (initial phase of the transition to an intensive agriculture).”

Furthermore, as the third and fourth measures in the list above shows, “improved farming technology” is a key element to support the “transition” to high efficiency agricultural production in Mozambique. According to ProSAVANA’s master plan, “the low use of [agricultural] inputs must be a main reason of low productivity of crops” in Mozambique. Thus, the master plan recommends the introduction and promotion of agricultural inputs such as quality seeds, agrochemicals (fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides), agriculture machinery and irrigation systems.

Moreover, as the list above demonstrates, ProSAVANA’s fifth main measure concerns the issue of markets. As stated in the programme’s goal, ProSAVANA’s new development model seeks a “market-oriented” approach with “competitive edge.” Beyond the question of output of production, ProSAVANA’s market orientation also has to do with the fact that the
programme counts on private investors as its main driving force. In this regard, ProSAVANA’s implementation will be backed unofficially by a funding initiative that was also elaborated by FGV Projects, called the Nacala Fund. Launched in 2013, the Nacala Fund aims to raise US$2 billion in 10 years to finance agribusiness investors along the Nacala Corridor. According to Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013), the Fund has so far selected ten Brazilian farmers that should work in cooperation with four medium-sized Mozambican producers. The authors highlight that the Nacala Fund is being marketed as offering “investments with low risk and high return,” since risks should be minimized by ProSAVANA’s “institutional package” (FGV Projetos 2012: 58 *apud* Nogueira & Ollinaho 2013).

In addition, private investors shall be attracted by ProSAVANA’s quick impact projects. According to ProSAVANA’s master plan, such projects “will showcase the potential for agriculture development in the Nacala Corridor” and thus, “attract donors to finance the projects proposed in the master plan, and attract local and foreign companies to invest in agriculture and agribusiness projects.”89 The attraction of investors has also been the goal of events organized by ABC and Embrapa in Brazil. For instance, according to a report by Embrapa90, ABC, Embrapa and JICA organized in 2011 an event called “International Conference Agribusiness in Mozambique – International Cooperation Japan-Brazil and investment opportunities”. During the event held in São Paulo, the ProSAVANA programme was presented to Japanese and Brazilian farmers and other agribusiness stakeholders.

The largest quick impact project listed in ProSAVANA’s master plan is a 60,000 integrated grain cluster project, which is supposed to have “high profitability,” as “the [internal rate of return] was calculated at 20.3% and the payback is 9 years.” For this project, small farmers are supposed to be “incorporated [...] in the business through promotion, contracts, including hand labour and the establishment of production villages in case when resettlement in needed.”91

In this regard, ProSAVANA interviewees92 affirmed that, in response to the concern raised over resettlement measures and land grabbing, contract farming will be the programme’s

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89 Text 79: 4-1.
90 Text 73.
91 Text 79: 3-43.
92 Interview 6.
main modus operandi. In short, this agricultural production scheme is based on gathering local farmers and peasants to produce a certain crop on their land and sell it to contracting private companies. As interviewees at JICA and the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture explain, private investors will be advised to follow guidelines of responsible agricultural development so that, for instance, contract farming can take place in a way that peasants will not necessarily have to be dispossessed of their land\textsuperscript{93}.

Moreover, ProSAVANA foresees the concession of credit lines to boost local farmer’s production. For instance, in one of the quick impact projects, the programme’s master plan proposes “an affordable agricultural loan at a low interest rate” in order to “widely promote” the out-grower scheme for soybean production.\textsuperscript{94} As confirmed by several interviewees\textsuperscript{95} and the programme’s master plan, soybean is most likely to be the main crop to be promoted within ProSAVANA. For example, an agricultural engineer who used to work in ProSAVANA’s research phase confirmed in an interview that soybean was the main crop in the test fields.\textsuperscript{96} ProSAVANA interviewees defend that soybean is a stable commodity that can be well integrated in value chain schemes and as such contributes to the raise of income of local producers.

Overall, in line with Brazil’s argument of the necessity of new development models from the South, ProSAVANA has the challenging goal of “[creating] new agricultural development models”\textsuperscript{97} for Mozambique. In short, ProSAVANA’s development approach is in practice mainly based on the increase of agricultural production through agricultural modernization and on subsequent raise of income. Inspired by the green revolution and by the development of Brazil’s agribusiness sector from the 1970s on, the programme’s development framework can be understood under the notion of modernization. In order to finance such shift to modern agricultural production, the programme will attract and incorporate foreign investors who, mainly via contract farming, will promote and buy the production of soybean and other crops by local farmers.

\textsuperscript{93} Idem.
\textsuperscript{94} Text 79: 4-36.
\textsuperscript{95} See e.g. Interviews 8, 9, 13 and 14.
\textsuperscript{96} See Interview 13.
\textsuperscript{97} Text 77.
6.4 Between discourse and practice: ProSAVANA from a critical standpoint

The ProSAVANA programme has been marked by a large controversy between civil society and governments. In order to deepen the analysis of ProSAVANA’s development approach, this section will look at the controversy, analysing the gap between the programme’s discourse and practice. To do so, I examine more closely the critiques of the programme, based on literature and on interviews with experts, government and civil society actors.

As I showed in the previous sections, the development discourse underlying the conception of ProSAVANA implies that the programme was discursively presented in terms of adequate technical solutions to certain (under)development-related problems. However, various interviewees questioned the way that ProSAVANA addressed both the problems as well as the solutions. In general, the main issues of poverty and food insecurity in Mozambique were uncontested by the interviewees. In addition, virtually all interviewees agreed that Mozambique’s chronic malnutrition index is alarming. Nevertheless, some questioned ProSAVANA’s assumption that malnutrition in Mozambique is simply caused by low agricultural productivity. They claim that this problem is much more complex. As a nutritionist at Mozambique’s Education Ministry stated in an interview:

> the biggest problem of malnutrition in Mozambique is not because Mozambique does not produce food, but it is exactly because they do not know how to use what they produce. So they produce and sell everything and when they consume it they do not consume it the way they should. So, [inadequate nutritional education] contributes a lot to the problem of malnutrition.  

An agricultural engineer working at the Mozambican government explained that low agricultural production and thus “lack of food” are conditions indeed present in 33 Mozambican districts that are located in arid or semiarid zones; none of them are included in ProSAVANA’s target area though. As interviewees pointed out, the statistics on malnutrition and food insecurity in these districts have a strong weight in the national index.

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98 Translation mine. Original: “O maior problema da desnutrição não é porque Moçambique não produz comida, é exatamente porque eles não sabem usar o que produzem. Então eles produzem e vendem tudo e quando consomem aquilo não consomem da forma como deveria ser. Então, [...] educação alimentar, né, que não está adequada, então isso contribui bastante pra questão da desnutrição” (Interview 18).

99 According to two interviewed nutritionists working for the Mozambican government (Interview 18), many Mozambicans, for instance, lack knowledge in preparing their vegetables in a way that the nutrients are conserved or, due to cultural habits, tend to have a rather nutritionally poor diet.

100 Interview 18.

101 Translation mine. Original: “falta de comida” (Interview 18).

102 These districts are located in the following provinces: Inhambane, Manica, Gaza and Tete.
Therefore, civil society interviewees criticise ProSAVANA for not selecting exactly the districts with the worst condition of the issue that the programme aims to address.

The solutions proposed by ProSAVANA are also contested. Civil society actors stress that the programme’s focus on raising agricultural efficiency might not be best strategy to achieve food security and poverty eradication. According to different interviewees\footnote{See e.g. Interviews 14 and 20.}, agricultural productivity is not the main factor causing poverty and food security issues, as these two problems are related to a series of structural issues. Virtually all civil society interviewees doubt that these problems can be encompassed by a single productivity-oriented mega-programme such as ProSAVANA.

For instance, ProSAVANA focusses on the increase of agricultural efficiency through the increase in use of modern agricultural technology. However, besides pointing out the environmental impacts of the increased use of agrochemicals, civil society interviewees\footnote{See e.g. Interviews 8 and 14.} question the impact of such a modernization approach in the face of the majorly traditional, subsistence-oriented agriculture in Mozambique. Some civil society interviewees\footnote{See e.g. Interviews 8 and 10.} believed that Mozambican peasants would not benefit from working with modern agricultural tools that require high monetary investments. According to these interviewees, the promotion of the use of such external technology would also create dependency structures, which might be prejudicial for low-income local producers with little market experience.

Another controversial measure is ProSAVANA’s focus on contract farming. Although this might be a response to the general concern over the issue of land grabbing, such a strategy is also criticised by civil society actors. As, for example, an interviewee from the NGO JAI-Environmental Justice recounted\footnote{See e.g. Interview 8.}, ProSAVANA presented contract farming as an alternative to resettlement strategies, only after criticism was raised. Yet, the interviewee stressed that contract farming is detrimental to food security. She remembered the case of another agricultural development programme that also promoted contract farming. According to her, in the context of this other programme, the contracting company accused the contracted farmers of delivering a low quality product and offered, thus, a lower price. The contracted...
farmers could not negotiate with the company and, due to the absence of other buyers, had to sell their product for a much lower price. As she explained, many contracted farmers ended up in a difficult economic situation. According to a UNAC member, in one of ProSAVANA’s test production schemes being applied, the usage rights of a large parcel of land, where 270 peasant families lived, was given to a big soybean enterprise. In order to not be displaced, the peasants living in that area agreed to work under contract farming for the company, growing soybean. Thus, as Nogueira (2014) summarizes, especially due to the power asymmetry in arrangements between small farmers and large investors, contract farming can be very prejudicial to producers. Thereby, contracted small farmers often fall into indebtedness and find difficulties in detaching themselves from the contracting buyer. Therefore, for Nogueira (idem), especially if one takes into account Mozambican government’s fragile ability in providing pro-peasantry law enforcement vis-à-vis foreign investors, contract farming schemes in that country might not contribute to raising the income of peasants or to their food security.

Furthermore, all civil society interviewees disagreed with ProSAVANA’s agribusiness approach. According to these interviewees, the promotion of export-oriented cultivation of cash crops and agricultural commodities such as soybean might rather be counterproductive to food security, as it makes local populations vulnerable to international markets, price variations and other external factors. For civil society interviewees and other experts, the domestic market should be the focus of any agricultural development programme that aims to benefit the Mozambican population. As a NGO JA! interviewee pointed out, Mozambican peasants are already responsible for the production of most of Mozambique’s food. According to her, an agribusiness approach might even benefit a few farmers but is not compatible with the livelihood of the Mozambican peasantry, which represents at least 80% of the Mozambican population.

In addition, although ProSAVANA’s discourse was based on the assumption that northern Mozambique and the Brazilian cerrado region are very similar, interviewees and authors (e.g. Funada Classen 2013a) stressed that, among other differences, both regions have a

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107 See Interview 14.
108 See e.g. Interviews 8, 14, 15, 19 and 20.
109 Interview 8.
110 Idem.
fundamental discrepancy in terms of demography: while the rural cerrado has a low population density, ProSAVANA’s target area is very densely occupied. Similar to most rural areas of Mozambique, the population of this area is essentially composed of peasants’ families living on small-scale parcels of land\textsuperscript{111}. Therefore, the NGO JA!\textsuperscript{112} for instance, fears that any large-scale agricultural production project in that area would have a tremendous social impact, and could lead to land grabbing. In turn, an Embrapa interviewee\textsuperscript{113} stated that the fact that most Mozambican farmers live in small-parcels of land is “a very serious land problem”\textsuperscript{114} and an obstacle to ProSAVANA’s implementation.

Moreover, civil society actors pointed to important inconsistencies between Brazil’s South-South cooperation discourse, in general, and ProSAVANA’s practical conception. According to several interviewees\textsuperscript{115}, as it became clear in the context of the making of the first version of the programme’s master plan, the principle of participation is lacking. As also observed by Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013), the consultation process with affected communities had a rather explanatory approach, not allowing them to actually participate in the programme’s formulation. Nonetheless, ProSAVANA interviewees\textsuperscript{116} argued that, for the new master plan, the participation process was done more extensively. Yet, civil society actors\textsuperscript{117} still maintained that this process was poorly done, as neither the demands of local communities nor the suggestions of peasant and environmental movements were incorporated into the programme’s framework. Also, on an institutional level, it is debatable how much the Mozambican government participates in the programme formulation. According to Nogueira and Ollinaho’s (2013) study based on interviews with actors related to ProSAVANA, policy makers and workers in the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture claim to feel a limitation in their involvement at the programme’s formulation, as they rather “wait to see what [their Japanese and Brazilian colleagues] propose” (idem: 12). Nogueira (2014) and Funada Classen (2013a) also highlight that, especially due to its high dependency on foreign aid and foreign

\textsuperscript{111} Interview 14.
\textsuperscript{112} Interview 8.
\textsuperscript{113} Interview 3.
\textsuperscript{114} Translation mine. Original: “O problema fundiário de Moçambique é muito sério” (interview 3).
\textsuperscript{115} Interviews 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20.
\textsuperscript{116} See e.g. Interviews 1 and 6.
\textsuperscript{117} Interviews 8, 10, 13, 14 and 15.
Investments flows, Mozambique’s government has little ability or power to influence the guidance of international development cooperation programmes.\textsuperscript{118}

Beyond participation, other guiding principles of Brazil’s South-South cooperation were not closely followed in ProSAVANA’s practical conception. Despite the argument that Brazil’s development cooperation programmes are demand-driven, interviewees and authors pointed out that ProSAVANA was conceived under a donor-proposal approach. As Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013) explain, the idea of the programme was born through long negotiations between Japanese and Brazilian governmental actors, which, as Funada Classen (2013a: 2) explains, is reflected by the programme’s original name: “Brazil-Japan Partnership for Development in Mozambique.” As was admitted by a FGV Projetos consultant\textsuperscript{119} and an ABC coordinator interviewee\textsuperscript{120} as well, the Mozambican government was incorporated into the programme’s formulation in a second step.

Furthermore, the fact that ProSAVANA was proposed by Brazilian and Japanese governments makes many civil society actors question the principle of solidarity within Brazil’s cooperation approach. In addition, despite the Brazilian government’s argument that its development cooperation is untied in terms of conditionalities, different civil society interviewees\textsuperscript{121} and authors were convinced that ProSAVANA is highly (if not primarily) motivated by Brazil’s and Japan’s own economic and political interests. Chichava et al. (2013) and Cabral et al. (2013) highlight that ProSAVANA is a key foreign policy manoeuvre to guarantee Mozambique’s political alliance in the sphere of international fora, supporting Brazil in its pursuit of more geopolitical influence. According to the authors (idem), Mozambique’s support was decisive for Brazil’s achievement of lead positions in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries and in international organizations such as FAO and WTO. In addition to several inconsistencies, Funada Classen (2013a, 2013b) points to the fact that ProSAVANA had a very

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} However, although the scope of my analysis does not allow me to further examine this aspect, civil society interviewees affirmed that certain actors within the Mozambican government might also have personal economic interests in promoting ProSAVANA (interviews 10, 13 and 14). For instance, an UNAC member (interview 14) stated that a Mozambican ex-president is the owner of a soybean enterprise working within ProSAVANA. Therefore, the agency of the Mozambican government should not be underestimated. Nonetheless, in the case of the trilateral conception of ProSAVANA, the imbalance in the relations of power between the proposing parts and the receiving country appear to be prevailing.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Text 43.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Interview 1.
\item \textsuperscript{121} See e.g. Interviews 8, 10, 13 and 15.
\end{itemize}
positive reception in Japanese and Brazilian business-oriented spheres, being repetitively framed by media in terms of “business opportunities,” gives a hint to the programme’s commercial motivation. According to Funada Classen (2013a, 2013b), Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013) and civil society interviewees\textsuperscript{122}, another indicator of the business motivation behind ProSAVANA is the fact that the Brazilian government organized or facilitated at least two field missions in the programme’s target area. These field missions were composed of Brazilian parliamentarians and several other agribusiness actors to collect impressions of the region\textsuperscript{123}

Also, within the three months of my research stay in Mozambique, two different business events with the main topic being expansion of the “Brazilian agribusiness model” in Mozambique took place in Maputo and Nacala. One was organized by the Brazilian embassy and the other received a committee of Brazilian agribusiness investors. Although their relation to ProSAVANA itself is unclear, they indicate that Brazilian agribusiness actors and investors have a significant interest in agricultural projects in Mozambique.

Finally, one can also question the “mutual” component of Brazil’s South-South cooperation’s core guiding principle of mutual development. Overall, civil society interviewees\textsuperscript{124} and some authors (e.g. Funada Classen 2013a, Garcia & Kato 2014) claimed that ProSAVANA will benefit Brazilian, Japanese and other foreign actors, much more than Mozambican peasants. For Funanda Classen (2013a, 2013b) and many civil society interviewees, the various discrepancies between the programme’s official rhetoric and its practice are a sign that ProSAVANA is led by the economic interests of those who proposed it. Confirming the suspects of civil society actors, an ABC employee affirmed in an interview off the record\textsuperscript{125} that ProSAVANA will be good for Brazil’s commercial balance, as the Brazilian agribusiness sector can export machinery and agricultural products to Mozambique. Moreover, some civil society interviewees\textsuperscript{126} believed that, under ProSAVANA’s framework, local farmers might be exploited as cheap agricultural labour force by international investors and agribusiness actors, which will be the largest beneficiaries of the programme.

\textsuperscript{122} See e.g. Interview 10.
\textsuperscript{123} According to Nogueira and Ollinaho (2013), one of these missions occurred in November 2012, when about 70 Brazilian investors visited the Nacala Corridor.
\textsuperscript{124} See e.g. Interviews 8, 10, 13 and 15.
\textsuperscript{125} Interview 5.
\textsuperscript{126} Interviews 8 and 13.
Thus, as the interviews demonstrated, the “new” in ProSAVANA’s development approach still appears to be lacking. Overall, ProSAVANA appears to present a modernization view of development, which has been at the core of the agricultural development from the 1960s onwards in Brazil, marked by the green revolution.\textsuperscript{127} Although the centrality that contract farming took in the programme’s strategy might be a current response to concerns regarding land grabbing effects (Nogueira & Ollinaho 2013), the programme’s clear modernization approach is accused of lacking innovation and sensitivity for local concerns. For civil society interviewees, the simple application in the Mozambican reality of a Brazilian agribusiness-oriented agricultural development, or what Mozambican peasant movement actors have called “the Brazilian agricultural model,” would not be beneficial to Mozambique’s rural population. Different civil society interviewees\textsuperscript{128} stressed their concern that the Mozambican agriculture under the action of ProSAVANA will develop in the same direction as the Brazilian cerrado, i.e. towards a highly mechanized, virtually manual labour-free, monoculture-based, environmentally impacting, resource intensive, large-scale, export-oriented and commodity-centred agriculture. As these interviewees highlighted, the green revolution approach might have indeed raised agricultural efficiency quantitatively in Brazil. However, it also brought with it the dispossession of peasants’ lands, landlessness and massive rural exodus and thus, did not contribute significantly to poverty reduction or to food security. Therefore, Mozambican civil society’s biggest concern is that such modern development models envisioned by ProSAVANA would exclude the Mozambican population from the benefits of development. In sum, civil society interviewees\textsuperscript{129} fear that the negative side effects of the agricultural development in Brazil would be particularly exacerbated in Mozambique since the rural space in this country is densely inhabited by peasants.

\textsuperscript{127} As explained by an interviewee at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interview 22), ProSAVANA can be understood as representative of what seems to be a second green revolution, a process which takes place today especially on the African continent.

\textsuperscript{128} Interviews 8 and 14.

\textsuperscript{129} Interviews 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.
7. Final remarks

The phenomenon of South-South cooperation has presented a challenge for social scientists and international analysts. Emerging in the mid-2000s, the still understudied international development cooperation approach offered by Brazil is one of the most emblematic representatives of this phenomenon. Brazil’s South-South cooperation is embedded in a discourse that claims that Southern states should strengthen themselves vis-à-vis the Global North and strive to pursue a new development paradigm based on their mutual interests. Considered the main showcase of Brazil’s development cooperation, the ProSAVANA programme aims to create new development models for rural Mozambique, inspired by Brazilian agricultural knowhow. Yet, this Japanese-Brazilian-Mozambican agricultural development programme has raised much controversy, having its development approach severely criticized by Mozambican civil society. As I have striven to show throughout the present work, analysing the discrepancies between discourse and practice of the emblematic case of ProSAVANA contributes significantly to the comprehension of South-South cooperation development programmes.

In the last years, International Relations scholars have made efforts to comprehend Brazil’s South-South cooperation and its impact in the global scene. For many scholars, the novelty of Brazil’s international development approach, whether purely rhetoric or not, could have the power to challenge North-South relations and with it the mainstream development aid paradigm, thus offering a new development approach based on more fairness, justice, transparency and mutual benefits. In this thesis, I have contributed to this debate, advancing the gaze on this subject beyond the usual institutional and state-centred foci of most International Relations scholars (cf. Smith 2004). Thereby, under the light of development theories, I have set my analytical focus on the development concept within Brazil’s South-South cooperation approach, from its discourse to its application in the field. Based on my analysis of the ProSAVANA programme, I have shown that Brazil’s development cooperation is discursively constructed with an emphasis on a new, status quo-challenging notion of international development. However, in its practice it reproduces old development and cooperation models.
As we have seen, Brazil’s South-South cooperation is discursively sustained by its guiding principles of solidarity, partnership, horizontality, mutual benefit and differentiated view on development. Distancing its approach from the traditional North-South aid framework, Brazil’s international cooperation embraces the notion of development from and for the South as its core element, connecting it with the ideas of South-South solidarity and affinity, mutual benefit and common development goals. As the discourse analysis of texts and interviews has demonstrated, Brazilian governmental actors argue for the strengthening of South-South ties in pursuing common development goals. In addition to Brazil’s claim that the development models for the North are exhausted, Brazilian governmental actors articulate a storyline that maintains that the Global South should search for their own way of development, thereby obtaining certain economic and political independence from the Global North. Therefore, analysing this discourse in its epistemological layer, we can understand such ideas and storylines within the thought of dependency theory. As I have shown, this school of thought emerged in Latin America in the 1960s and has since influenced foreign policy strategies on the continent. Dependency theory-inspired development strategies are particularly visible in the context of Brazil’s national-developmentalism approach, which regained force especially within the last 13 year of Presidents Lula and Rousseff administration. In short, according to dependency theorists, developing nations are set in an unequal global order structure, which condemns them to be in a disadvantaged position in terms of economic trade and development vis-à-vis developed nations. As some of these scholars argued, regional development and trade among developing nations could be more efficient as a development strategy for these states (cf. Preston 1996, Leys 1996).

In this context, Brazil’s international development cooperation programmes in Africa are discursively articulated as part of this South-South-oriented development strategy. Thereby, the ProSAVANA programme is presented by Brazilian actors as a South-South cooperation programme that, inspired by the success of the green revolution in the Brazilian cerrado, aims to modernise Mozambican agriculture, raising its efficiency and market competitiveness, thus generating income, reducing food insecurity and contributing to rural and regional development. As the analysis of the discourse on the programme has shown, similar to most development cooperation programmes, ProSAVANA is presented in terms of a set of specific technical solutions to certain problems related to lack of development. As Murray Li (2007)
explains, such problems addressed by development policy are usually only identified or constructed according to an available solution. The main problems evoked in ProSAVANA’s discourse are the allegedly causally interrelated low agricultural productivity, on the one hand, and poverty and food insecurity on the other. Thereby, similar to the case of development workers in Tanzania studied by Eriksson Baaz (2005 apud Ziai 2010), in different texts and interviews, ProSAVANA promoters often portray rural Mozambique based on notions of “backwardness” and underdevelopment, backed by statistics that reinforce the argument of Mozambique’s severe food insecurity and malnutrition.

However, experts and civil society actors questioned ProSAVANA framework’s assumption that food insecurity can be simply solved through increased agricultural efficiency. According to civil society actors and other experts on the issue, Mozambique’s rural poverty and food insecurity is much more complex than what agricultural technical improvements can solve. Even the way ProSAVANA addresses the issue of chronic malnutrition, which validates Brazil’s cooperation’s powerful rhetoric of “fight against hunger,” was called into question. As experts explained, the issue of chronic malnutrition in Mozambique is also strongly related to lack of nutritional education and other cultural factors, and not necessarily to lack of food. In addition, as we have seen, some interviewees also questioned ProSAVANA’s use of such statistics on food insecurity and malnutrition, arguing that the general national indexes are heavily biased by certain zones affected by drought - any of which is located in the programme’s target area. Here, we can trace a parallel to Mitchell’s (1995, 2002, 2009 apud Ziai 2010) studies of how World Bank’s representation of Egypt was based on false assumptions or to Ferguson’s (1994) observation of how statistical data on Lesotho was shaped to prove the existence of an agricultural crisis and to portray that “less developed country” as a “traditional peasant subsistence society [...] virtually untouched by modernity” (idem: 27). As structurally characteristic of the development discourse within international cooperation programmes in general, the same happens in the context of Brazil’s South-South cooperation: Mozambique is portrayed as a poor, food insecure, traditional peasant society that, in order to overcome this condition and achieve rural development, requires the agricultural technology and knowledge that Brazil and Japan can deliver.

130 See e.g. Interview 2.
131 Interview 19.
Moreover, the analysis of ProSAVANA’s practice has shown that the programme has not strictly followed Brazil’s South-South cooperation’s guiding principles and discourse. In sum, ProSAVANA’s conception was mainly proposed by Japan and Brazil, excluding Mozambican government actors and thus lacking horizontality. Besides having a donor-proposal character, the programme’s approach was top-down, as affected communities were not consulted throughout the programme’s conceptualization and during most of its formulation phase. Although the programme’s discourse and practice have to a certain extent adapted to concerns over land grabbing, virtually all interviewed civil society actors claim that their critiques and suggestions have not been regarded, which confirms that the principle of participation is lacking. Furthermore, all economic interests expressed for example by Brazilian agribusiness actors and other foreign investors, in addition to other political interests behind the programme, raise doubts whether ProSAVANA is actually not tied to Brazil’s interests. Moreover, all these and other factors put into question whether ProSAVANA is driven by mutual development goals. The discourse of Brazil’s South-South cooperation is marked by the notions of fight against poverty and fight against hunger when presented to African nations, but when presented to Brazilian business sectors, suddenly Brazil’s cooperation programmes in Africa are framed as business opportunities. In the case of ProSAVANA, the prospective of profit for investors raise a general impression among Mozambican civil society actors that the programme is led by foreign economic interests and will not benefit Mozambican peasants as much. This suspicion is reinforced by civil society members’ and experts’ opinion that the programme’s approach will not contribute to food security.

Overall, on an epistemological level, the analysis of the discourse and practice of ProSAVANA shows that the programme’s approach follows an understanding of development according to modernization theory. Although the programme is supposed to aim creating new development models, any possibility of innovation of its approach is paradoxically limited by its focus on modernization. As we have seen, the modernization development paradigm has been in vogue since the 1950s, scientifically backed among others by Rostow (1960). Ever since, modernization has been present throughout traditional North-South development aid schemes. Modernization has been the motto of rural development policy, propelling the phenomenon of the green revolution, with its most observable effects in countries of the
Global South. It marked the approach of the Japanese-Brazilian development cooperation programme as well as Brazil’s rural development, which transformed the Brazilian cerrado into an industrial, export-oriented agricultural space and inspired the ProSAVANA programme itself.

In general, Brazil’s South-South cooperation is discursively sustained by a powerful new rhetoric, which speaks out for a new development paradigm for and by the Global South. However, the present analysis disagrees with the optimism of some IR scholars, confirming the scepticism raised by others. As the study of the ProSAVANA case shows, the practice of Brazilian international development programmes repeats an old story. Led by a modernization-centred notion of development, it has disregarded affected communities’ concerns and wishes that cannot be encompassed by its package of certain technical solutions. Responding rather to the needs of international markets and capital, it ends up replicating patterns of structural exploitation. In so doing, it might end up not being able to solve the very problems it identifies and addresses.

Finally, the question remains whether there are alternatives for a different or new development approach within Brazil’s or the wider South-South international development cooperation. Maintaining the focus on the cooperation between Brazil and Mozambique, another current, yet much smaller rural development programme might offer a fruitful insight: the PAA Africa. The small-budget Purchase from Africans for Africa programme (PAA Africa) addresses the same problems of food insecurity and rural poverty in Mozambique, but with an approach that is very different from ProSAVANA’s. Based on an agro-ecologic model of rural development, PAA Africa targets local peasants in zones with high food insecurity, promoting the production of food crops for subsistence and school feeding. Yet, just like ProSAVANA, PAA Africa was formulated as a donor-proposal approach. In addition, its future is very uncertain due to lack of political and financial support. Further research would be necessary to examine the implementation of PAA Africa and to observe to what extent its differentiated, pro-peasantry rural development model would indeed benefit those targeted by the programme.

Analysing the concept of development is crucial to understand international development cooperation. As the contrast between ProSAVANA and PAA Africa shows, there are indeed different ideas and concepts of development, which can be articulated in response to the
same problems, according to different political contexts and motivations. Although dressed up with a somewhat new rhetoric, the development concept within ProSAVANA is clearly determined by modernization theory. As such, its application happens according to status-quo structures, thus embedded in and influenced by economic, capitalist interests. Thus, it is surely not by chance that ProSAVANA is perhaps Brazil’s biggest international development cooperation programme, receiving the largest budget, most personnel and most political notoriety.

In this sense, although arguing for a development from the South to the South, Brazil’s international development cooperation falls in the same paradox as dependency theory: the ideal of development remains oriented by standards set by Global North. Therefore, in order to create an international development cooperation that in fact speaks and acts for the Global South, one must question, reinvent, de- and reconstruct the concept of development. A possible simple first step for such endeavour would be hearing – and listening – to those considered to be beneficiaries of development programmes. Perhaps the most fruitful source for conceiving a new ideal on development for and from the South lies in the engagement with the views and ideas of better life from those whose lives are to be changed.
Bibliographic references


### A.1 List of interviews with members of institutions responsible for the ProSAVANA programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview number</th>
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<th>Date and place</th>
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<td>Brazilian Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Embrapa – Brazilian Corporation of Agricultural Research</td>
<td>03 Apr. 2014, Brasilia</td>
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<td>04 Apr. 2014, Brasilia</td>
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<td>03 Nov. 2014, Maputo</td>
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<td>Japanese International Cooperation Agency</td>
<td>17 Nov. 2015, Maputo</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture</td>
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### A.2 List of interviews with members of social movements and civil society organizations

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<td>JA! - Justiça Ambiental! (Environmental Justice!)</td>
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<td>Adecru - Acção Académica para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais (Academic Initiative for the Development of Rural Communities)</td>
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<td>16</td>
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A.3 List of interviews with PAA Africa promoters and other experts

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<td>Mozambican Ministry of Education</td>
<td>27 Nov. 2014, Maputo</td>
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<td>OMR - <em>Observatório do Meio Rural</em> (Observatory of the Rural space)</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td><em>CG Fome</em> - Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ General Coordination Office for International Action Against Hunger</td>
<td>06 Jan. 2015, Berlin/Brasilia</td>
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Appendix B – Textual material: press texts and official documents

B.1 Overview of texts analysed

All texts used for the present work were retrieved in April 2014. The table below clarifies the different text, their reference numbers and their sources:

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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Texts reference numbers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ press</td>
<td>From text 1 to text 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planato Palace’s press</td>
<td>From text 35 to text 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGV Projetos</td>
<td>From text 40 to text 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian Cooperation Agency</td>
<td>Text 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embrapa</td>
<td>From text 45 to text 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ProSAVANA website and documents</td>
<td>Texts 77-79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B.2 References of press texts and official documents

B.2.1 Texts from Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ press

Text 1


Text 2


Text 3


Text 4


Text 5


Nota nº 285. Assistência humanitária a Moçambique. 06 May 2010 - Available at: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/assistencia-humanitaria-a-mocambique/?searchterm=Mo%C3%A7ambique.


Artigo do Senhor Ministro de Estado das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Celso Amorim, no jornal Folha de S. Paulo.” N.d. Available at: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-


Text 28


Text 29


Text 30


Text 31


Text 32


Text 33

durante-encerramento-do-seminario-empresarial-brasil-zambia/?searchterm=Mo%20%C3%A7ambique.

Text 34


B.2.2 Texts from Planato Palace’s press

Text 35


Text 36


Text 37


B.2.3 Texts from FGV Projetos

Text 40

Text 41


Text 42


Text 43


B.2.4 Texts from ABC

Text 44


B.2.5 Textos from Embrapa

Text 45

“Avançam ações de projeto conjunto entre Brasil, Japão e Moçambique.” 31 Jan. 2012. Available at: https://www.embrapa.br/busca-de-noticias/-/noticia/1461641/avancam-acoes-de-projeto-conjunto-entre-brasil-japao-e-mocambique

Text 46

“Prosavanas Leva Desenvolvimento a Moçambique.” Available at: http://www.cnps.embrapa.br/noticias/banco_noticias/20110830.html.

Text 47


Text 48


Text 49

“Pesquisadores da Embrapa Algodão participam de missão de prospecção na África.” 14 May 2013. Available at: http://www.cnps.embrapa.br/noticias/2013/noticia_20130514.html

Text 50
“Paralelos: informações geoespaciais para a gestão dos recursos naturais e para o desenvolvimento agrícola de Moçambique.” N.d. Available at: http://www.cnpm embrapa.br/projetos/mocambique/.

Text 51


Text 52


Text 53

“Missão em Moçambique vai realizar levantamentos no Corredor de Maputo.” 17 May 2012. Available at: http://www.embrapa.br/imprensa/noticias/2012/maio/3a-semana/missao-em-mocambique-vai-realizar-levantamentos-no-corredor-de-maputo/.

Text 54


Text 55


Text 56


Text 57


Text 58


Text 59


Text 60

Text 61


Text 62

“Arraes assina em Maputo projeto de transferência de tecnologia.” 08 Nov. 2010. Available at: http://www.embrapa.br/imprensa/noticias/2010/novembro/2a-semana/arraes-assina-em-

Text 63


Text 64


Text 66


Text 67


Text 68


Text 69


Text 70


Text 71

Text 72


Text 73


Text 74


Text 75


Text 76

“Dirigentes da JICA visitam Embrapa para tratar da atuação na África.” 27 Apr. 11. Available at: http://www.cnpm.embrapa.br/saladeimprensa/content/view/321/1/

B.2.6 Texts from ProSAVANA’s website and ProSAVANA official documents

Text 77


Text 78


Text 79